CHAPTER 8

GILDA: TEXTUAL ANALYSIS, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND ETHNOGRAPHY

TOBY MILLER AND MARIANA JOHNSON

Gilda tries to get her dignity back through sex, Johnny through power—the same trophies many of us seek at Yale, the former on couches and the latter in classrooms


Will this get me a job?
Is TV bad for you?
How do we get that show back on?

—Questions posed by undergraduate majors in film and media studies.

An intramurally oriented, Anglo-dominated textual determinism has dominated film and media studies for decades.¹ It is our contention that scholars of film and media studies should become more self-consciously interdisciplinary in their
means, and public in their focus, following the examples of many other text-based critics across the humanities who have retrained themselves and now contribute to public-cultural debate. If practitioners remain embedded in the old ways, they risk a disciplinary myopia that diminishes their ability to innovate as researchers, and argue as public intellectuals. Money, law, policy, production, content, distribution, exhibition, and reception are all equally relevant to the study of the screen. Research from multiple disciplinary and international contexts can expose the interrelationships among these categories along the spectrum of audiovisual production.

In this essay, we question the efficacy of contemporary mainstream film and media studies’ dominant modes of analyzing texts, then investigate alternatives from political economy and media anthropology, seeking to blend economic and ethnographic insights with textual analysis. These methods offer a radical historicization of cultural context, supplementing the examination of textual properties and spectatorial processes with an account of occasionality that details the conditions under which texts are made, circulated, received, interpreted, and criticized. The life of any popular or praised text is a passage across space and time, a life remade again and again by institutions, discourses, and practices of distribution and reception. Cultural historian Roger Chartier proposed a tripartite approach to textual analysis, that is, reconstruction of “the diversity of older readings from their sparse and multiple traces”; a focus on “the text itself, the object that conveys it, and the act that grasps it”; and an identification of “the strategies by which authors and publishers tried to impose an orthodoxy or a prescribed reading on the text.”

This grid from the new cultural history turns away from reflectionism, which argues that a text’s key meaning lies in its overt or covert capacity to capture the zeitgeist. It also rejects formalism’s claim that a close reading of sound and image cues can secure a definitive meaning. Because texts accrete and attenuate meanings on their travels as they rub up against, trope, and are troped by other fictional and social texts, we must consider all the shifts and shocks that characterize their existence as cultural commodities, their ongoing renewal as the temporary “property” of varied, productive workers and publics, and the abiding “property” of businesspeople.

The essay concludes with an example of such an approach, applied to the career of the classic film noir, *Gilda*. Our Yale correspondent quoted above illustrates how key screen texts are taken up as guides for living, far beyond the imagination of the armchair critic, as when Ivy League scions use *Gilda* to conceptualize their quest for “vast sums of money and power.” For their part, the anonymous undergraduates from anonymous universities, also quoted above, are questioning film and media studies from a less Olympian perspective. Bearing in mind the importance of serving these lusty young leaders and followers of the future, we come to renew textual analysis with economic culturalism, not to bury it.
Problems with the State of Play

Film and media texts have always led lives that extend beyond their frames, inspiring dialogue, debate, antagonism, and even moral panic. There is a long history linking textual analysis to the screen in public culture. In the silent era, ethical critic Vachel Lindsay referred to "the moving picture man as a local social force . . . the mere formula of [whose] activities keeps the public well-tempered." Because film had the power to stimulate and regulate public life, it was both a threat and a boon to intellectuals and reformers. Various forms of social criticism connected moviegoing to gambling and horse racing, but some social reformers looked to the medium as a potential forum for moral uplift. If the screen could drive the young to madness, it might also provoke responsibility. Motion Picture Association of America bureaucrat Will Hays regarded the industry as an "institution of service" that riveted "the girders of society." These girders were erected over the bodies of others, of course, as critics have pointed out through acute, social-movement-linked textual analysis. In 1921, the Great Wall Motion Picture Studio was founded in New York by Chinese expatriates angered by U.S. industry and government neglect of their complaints about Hollywood representations of Chinese characters. It proceeded to produce films for export home as well as for the U.S. market. The following year, Mexico embargoed imported U.S. films because of the repugnant "greaser" genre, and was supported by other Latin American countries, Canada, France, and Spain.

But these forms of criticism, closely articulated to national and diasporic cultures and immigrant concerns, were soon supplanted as sources of knowledge for students and scholars by academic professionalism. Like the other emergent audiovisual media of the twentieth century, the cinema was quickly mined by sociology and psychology, where obsessions with propaganda and perception gave scientific and/or reactionary professors the opportunity to serve churches, businesses, and governments. Consider the Payne Fund studies’ research into the cinema’s effects on young people in the 1930s. These pioneering scholars boldly set out to gauge youthful emotional reactions by assessing, for example, "galvanic skin response." Examining how movies influenced children’s attitudes to race and sex, playground conduct, and sleeping patterns, the Payne fundees inaugurated mass social science panic about young people at the cinema. They were driven by academic, religious, and familial iconophobia in the face of large groups of people who were engaged by popular culture, and seemed able to elude the control of father, state, and ruling class.

Payne Fund concerns about the impact of the popular on young citizens inspired decades of remorseless media-effects work, a source of publicly funded nutrition to generations of psychologists via the U.S. model of social order through behavioral scientism, through seven decades of obsessive attempts to correlate
youthful consumption of popular culture with antisocial conduct. The pattern is that whenever new communications technologies emerge, children are immediately identified as both pioneers and victims, endowed by manufacturers and critics with immense power and yet immense vulnerability. This was true of 1920s “Radio Boy” amateurs, seeking out signals from afar, and it was true of 1990s “Girl Power” avatars, seeking out subjectivities from afar. They are held to be the first to know and the last to understand the media—the grand paradox of youth, latterly on display in the “digital sublime” of technological determinism, as always with the superadded valence of a future citizenship in peril. After the Second World War, the social sciences had begun the less lucrative and reactionary task of studying the film industry as a social institution, with the anthropology of Hortense Powdermaker and the sociology of J. P. Mayer calling for counterknowledge among the population. Powdermaker coined the expression “The Dream Factory,” which has since passed into public discourse. Regrettably, their work was eclipsed academically by the more instrumentally propitious arena of positivism, as cold war–style social science received greater material benefits and policy influence than critical ethnography.

And as for textual analysis, the Catholic Church engaged debates about the role of the film critic when Pope Pius XII issued Miranda Prorsus: Encyclical Letter on Motion Pictures, Radio and Television in 1957, stating that “…Catholic Film critics can have much influence; they ought to set the moral issue of the plots in its proper light, defending those judgments which will act as a safeguard against falling into so-called ‘relative morality,’ or the overthrow of that right order in which the lesser issues yield place to the more important.” The right kind of textual analysis could obviously mold good Catholic subjects. And indeed, textual analysis has become an ecumenical, even secular method of producing citizens, as per the missions of literary criticism and speech communication. As part of liberal education, the mission of cultivating ethically self-styling subjects includes screen analysis as part of its armature, alongside ethical criticism and other techniques.

In keeping with this history, we are routinely told with pride about film and media studies’ interdisciplinarity, which purportedly prepares it to participate at a high level intellectually, and a powerful one publicly. Yet a productive dialogue with public culture remains stifled, because the current orthodoxies of our field preclude us from contributing very much. Consider the following recent cases as tests of film and media studies’ contribution to debate. Ask yourself which forms of knowledge—and objects of analysis, including texts—might have added to our capacity to respond to (or initiate) relevant inquiry and commentary, and what it says about our politics that every major issue of public concern about film and media remains essentially unaddressed by our discipline:

- A 1999 content analysis published by the American Medical Association (AMA) examined feature-length animation films made in the United States
between 1937 and 1997 and their association of legal but damaging recrea-
tional drugs with heroism.\textsuperscript{19} The study received significant public attention, with endorsement by the AMA itself, a widely attended press conference, numerous media stories, and formal replies from Disney, which clearly felt provoked. Similar interest surrounded the 2001 release of findings that de-
spite the film industry and “big” tobacco companies agreeing to a voluntary ban on product placement in 1989, the incidence of stars smoking cigarettes in Hollywood films since that time had increased eleven-fold, mostly to get around bans on television commercials, while use in youth-oriented films had doubled since the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement between the to-
bacco companies and forty-six U.S. states. In addition to placing their products on film and television, the industry also provided stars with free cigarettes and cigars, encouraging them to smoke in public and during photographic and interview sessions as a quid pro quo.\textsuperscript{20} In response, the American Lung Association staged a public relations campaign on the topic to coincide with the 2002 Academy Awards, seeking to embarrass the industry to include warnings in its film ratings about tobacco use, alongside alcohol advisories. Major campaigns and studies have also been undertaken by the Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group and the University of California, San Francisco Medical School. Film and media studies contributed not a jot to this textual research, or subsequent public debate.

- In 2002, the Tisch School of the Arts at New York University, where we have both worked, received a formal note from the Motion Picture Association advising that copyrighted films were being illegally distributed onto a computer assigned to someone in that school’s bureaucracy. Administrators did not turn to the Department of Cinema Studies for advice on the legal, political, educational, textual, audience, technological, or privacy implica-
tions of the downloading and its surveillance by the association—and rightly so. We would have had nothing to offer.

- In the United States today, literally millions of people are petitioning the Federal Communications Commission about the impact on democracy and textual diversity of media ownership, control, access, and content. Yet large public events run by our vibrant media-reform and media-justice move-
ments feature virtually no one from U.S. film and media studies as speakers or audiences.\textsuperscript{21}

U.S. and British film and media studies are condemned to near irrelevancy in the public sphere of popular criticism, state and private policy, and social-move-
moment critique. Our mistake was to set up a series of nostra early on about what counted as knowledge, then police the borders. This is a standard disciplinary tactic.
It is very familiar rent-seeking conduct—effective as a form of gatekeeping, but ineffective as a means of dialogue.

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The particular donnés barely need rehearsal, but here is the binary of film and media studies’ good and bad objects:

Media studies is sometimes said to be more sociocultural than film studies in its inclinations and methods, but is this really correct? U.S. media studies takes it as something of a given that the mainstream media are not responsible for—well, anything. This position functions as a virtual nostrum in some research into, for instance, fans of television drama or sport, who are thought to construct connections with celebrities and actants in ways that mimic friendship, make sense of human interaction, and ignite cultural politics. This critique commonly attacks opponents of television for failing to allot the people’s machine its due as a populist apparatus that subverts patriarchy, capitalism, and other forms of oppression. Commercial television is held to have progressive effects, because its programs are decoded by viewers in keeping with their own social situations. That might suggest an attack on dominant ideology, but where is the evidence? Counterhegemonic activities are supposedly apparent to scholars from their perusal of audience conventions, Web pages, discussion groups, quizzes, and rankings, or by watching television with their children—very droll. But can fans be said to resist labor exploitation, patriarchy, racism, and U.S. neo-imperialism, or in some specifiable way make a difference to politics beyond their own selves, when they interpret texts unusually, dress up in public as men from outer space, or chat about their romantic frustrations? And what does it suggest about the subversive potential of a scholarly approach that privileges these consumer practices—to such an extent that it has taken hold in the first world at a moment when media policy fetishizes deregulation and governing at a distance?

The strand of U.S. media studies we are questioning emerged from venerable UK-based critiques of cultural pessimism, political economy, and current-affairs-oriented broadcasting. These critiques originated in reaction to a heavily regulated, duopolistic broadcasting system—1970s Britain—in which the BBC represented a high-culture snobbery that many leftists associated with an oppressive class structure. It is not surprising that there was a desire for a playful, commercial,
noncitizen address. As these accounts of television made their Atlantic crossing to the United States, where there was no public-broadcasting behemoth in need of critique, lots of not-very-leftist professors and students were ready to hear that U.S. audiences learning about parts of the world that their country bombs, invades, owns, misrepresents, or otherwise exploits were less important, and even less political, than those audiences’ interpretations of actually existing local soap operas, wrestling bouts, or science fiction series. For its part, in the United Kingdom, where deregulation has latterly opened up the television landscape to more commercial endeavors, as per the United States, the original critique of documentary seriousness looks tired—and when added to new forms of academic and governmental codification of media studies, it has arguably depoliticized much research there, as well, with scholars and students plumbing their own pleasures and preoccupations.

This is not to gainsay important achievements in film and media studies. Analysts have sought to account for and resist narrative stereotypes and exclusions—to explain, in Richard Dyer’s words, “why socialists and feminists liked things they thought they ought not to,” and why some voices and images are excluded or systematically distorted. This difficulty over pleasure, presence, and absence accounts for film theory being highly critical of prevailing representations, but never reifying itself into the puritanism alleged by critics of political correctness. The diversity of latter-day film anthologies makes the point clear. Contemporary black film volumes divide between spectatorial and aesthetic dimensions, queer ones identify links between social oppression and film and video practice, and feminist collections engage differences of race, history, class, sexuality, and nation, alongside and as part of theoretical difference. The implicit and explicit Eurocentrism, masculinism, and universalism of earlier analyses have been questioned by social movements and third and fourth world discourses that highlight exclusions and generate new methods. At the same time, U.S. binaries of black and white, straight and gay, continue to characterize much critical work.

Crucial elements continue to be left out of today’s dominant discourse of film and media studies—the major journals, book series, professional associations, and graduate programs. Our anecdotes about health, copyright, and media reform point to the disconnection of film and media studies from both popular and policy-driven discussion of films. This irrelevance flows from a lack of engagement with research conducted outside the textualist and historical side to the humanities. For example, humanities work on stardom seldom addresses research on that topic from the social sciences. Adding this material to the textual, theoreticist, and biographical preferences of humanities critics could offer new kinds of knowledge about, for instance, the impact of stars on box office, via regression analysis, and of work practices, via labor studies.
What Else Could Be Done?

Film and media texts are part of a multiform network of entertainment, via the Web, DVDs, electronic games, television, telephones, and multiplexes. The brief moment when cinema could be viewed as a fairly unitary phenomenon in terms of exhibition (say, 1920 to 1950) set up the conceptual prospect of its textual fetishization in academia, something that became technologically feasible with videocassette recorders—just when that technology’s popularity compromised the very discourse of stable aestheticization! Now that viewing environments, audiences, technologies, and genres are so multiple, the cinema is restored to a mixed-medium mode. No wonder some argue that “a film today is merely a billboard stretched out in time, designed to showcase tomorrow’s classics in the video stores and television reruns,” or that cinema is an aesthetic “engine driving . . . interlinked global entertainment markets.” And television? Alias continued its run on network television in the United States not because of high ratings, but because it posted the highest-ever DVD sales for drama programming.

The U.S. federal government’s official classification of screen production includes features, made-for-television films, television series, commercials, and music videos—and so should film and media studies’ “official classification.” We need to acknowledge the policy, distributional, promotional, and exhibitionary protocols of the screen at each site as much as their textual ones: enough talk of “economic reductionism” without also problematizing “textual reductionism”; enough valorization of close reading and armchair accounts of human interiority without ethical and political regard for the conditions of global cultural labor, and the significance of workers, texts, and subjectivities within social movements and demographic cohorts; enough denial of the role of government; enough teaching classes on animation, for instance, without reference to effects work, content analysis—and an international political economy that sees an episode of The Simpsons decrying globalization, when the program has itself been made by non-union animators in Southeast Asia. These issues—cultural labor, industry frameworks, audience experiences, patterns of meaning, and cultural policy—should be integral.

We need to view the screen through twin theoretical prisms. On the one hand, its texts can be understood as the newest component of sovereignty, a twentieth-century cultural addition to patrimony and rights that sits alongside such traditional topics as territory, language, history, and schooling. On the other hand, screen texts derive from a cluster of culture industries. They are subject to exactly the rent-seeking practices and exclusionary representational protocols that characterize liaisons between state and capital. We must ask:
Is film and media studies serving phantasmatic projections of humanities critics’ narcissism, or does it actively engage cultural policies and social-movement politics?

Do the popular media give the people of the world what they want, or do they operate via monopoly-capitalist business practice?

Is alternative/state-supported screen culture expanding the vision and availability of the good life to include the ability of a people to control its representation on screen?

Is that “alternative” culture merely a free ride for fractions of a comprador, cosmopolitan, or social-movement bourgeoisie?

To what extent do national television systems and cinemas engage their rhetorical publics?

What place does labor have in giving culture value? and

How can film and media studies intervene in the public sphere?

To understand the screen and its audiences in the contemporary world and engage with the complex, intersecting questions raised above, film and media studies can take advantage of diverse disciplinary approaches to the study of culture by confronting the ways in which film and media texts collide with the concerns of economics, cultural policy, and media, communication, and cultural studies. There is an increasing need for those working within the field to recognize the ways in which these different approaches are intertwined and can be placed into productive dialogue with one another. Scholarship that interprets an individual film text’s formal properties, for instance, should be concerned with how changes in technology or the labor process have influenced stylistic trends. From that insight follow several related, though rarely pursued, questions:

Where does this technology come from, geographically speaking?

How do policy and trade laws affect its availability and use?

What kind of labor by producer and audiences does it require? and

Who is doing that work, where, and with what impact?

Some of these questions are addressed by recent developments in ethnography. Whereas cultural anthropology largely avoided the media in the past, the transnational spread of electronic technology has led to the deconstruction of old ideas about place and culture, and a new alertness to the social worlds of the media and the workings of power within them that determine the production, content, and circulation of texts. Anthropologists have adapted cross-cultural ethnography and concerns for everyday life to the study of media practices worldwide via a materialist method that rejects the putative divisions of top-down versus bottom-up, of economy versus experience.

*Media Worlds: Anthropology on New Terrain* charts various critical anthropological perspectives that are now being brought to the study of media, addressing
a broad range of contexts: indigenous video production and political activism, subject formation, cultural politics of nation-states, social analysis of institutional sites of production, transnational media flows, and the social life of technology. This willingness to address both the self-determined image production of disenfranchised groups (for example, Kayapo cultural performance in Brazil) and the social structures underlying dominant media institutions (such as the homogenization and branding of Latinidad by powerful Spanish-language television networks in the United States) demonstrates the “simultaneity of hegemonic and antihegemonic effects.” It also shows that media ethnography can transcend narrow audience studies, such as uses-and-gratifications research that quizzes hyperspecific audiences about their likes and dislikes without regard for larger, culture-crossing structures of power and meaning. Ethnographies of media look at the production, distribution, and consumption of film and other media as they travel through a variety of circuits and spaces. In doing so, the approach brings attention to media environments and practices that may appear “off the grid,” situated outside the arenas in which film and media theorists typically operate.

For example, U.S. films are allotted various generic descriptions for use in specific markets. What could a static textual criticism tell us about the content of *Bram Stoker’s Dracula* (Francis Ford Coppola, 1992) when it circulates differently in various parts of the world? For the British release, Columbia TriStar arranged a fashion extravaganza for journalists to encourage talk about a new Goth look, leading to a spot on the BBC’s *Clothes Show*, and stories in *Harpers and Queen* magazine that located the meaning of the film in white urban style. *Dances with Wolves* (Kevin Costner, 1990) was sold in France as a documentary-style dramatization of Native American life, and *Malcolm X* (Spike Lee, 1991) was promoted there with posters of the Stars and Stripes aflame. *Sliver* (Phillip Noyce, 1993), which was shown in the United States with four minutes cut by Paramount censors, was promoted overseas as “The film America didn’t see,” returning twice its domestic revenue in foreign sales. Whereas U.S. trailers for *Moulin Rouge!* (Baz Luhrmann, 2001) featured a syrupy moment of terpsichory between lovers, Japanese audiences were provided a death-bed scene, due to their alleged interest in tragedy as honor. *Pearl Harbor* (Michael Bay, 2001) was promoted in Japan as a love story rather than the blend of righteous revenge and forgiving passion that provided a domestic focus elsewhere. Its trailer showed a Japanese airman warning children to take cover. After *Minority Report* (2002) failed domestically, director Stephen Spielberg and star Tom Cruise traveled everywhere they could to recoup a seemingly unwise investment via personal appearances in the auteur reaches of Europe, amidst new commercials that made the film “not like schoolwork.” The overseas release of *The Sweetest Thing* (Roger Kumble, 2002) included a segment considered too touchy for U.S. audiences: a performance number called “The Penis Song,” which featured the female leads singing “You’re too big to fit in” at their restaurant. *Master and Commander: The Far Side of the World* (Peter Weir, 2003)
was sold by Fox to transnational audiences by linking it to the 2003 men’s Rugby World Cup. Star Russell Crowe appeared on the Fox Sports World cable channel, interspersed with footage of rugby games and his performance in the film, talking about how rugby was both a metaphor and a technique for male bonding on the set. This was also a means for the network to cross-promote the movie with its coverage of sports spectacles. These key paratexts—guides to the meaning of “the film”—are accessible via a blend of political economy and ethnography.

The global South experiences Hollywood films in an entirely different context. Jeff Himpele has followed the life of such texts in La Paz, Bolivia, from their debut at the elite theater in the city centro, then up the surrounding canyon walls, where they play at various popular movies houses frequented by Aymara immigrants and their families. All the while, pirated video copies multiply and circulate. Using interviews with distributors and theater owners working in the city, Himpele demonstrated how print quality and exhibition map onto Bolivian social structure, with increases in altitude corresponding to indigenous identity and decreased social rank. Film exhibition is an extension of historical modes of distributing difference ingrained in colonial, race, and class hierarchies. Distribution in La Paz is a “spatializing practice,” delineating difference and constructing social imaginaries. Certain genres of film become associated with imagined zones of people, and each zone gets access to “new” releases at different times, depending on its perceived social, political, and economic status.

Although official distribution itineraries can be undermined by the proliferation of pirated videocassettes, early access to new releases is only one component of cultural capital’s prestige value. There is a certain status in renting from the commercial video store, just as there is prestige associated with which movie theater one attends. Himpele’s willingness to follow both dominant and subaltern circulation practices is significant, because it neither valorizes the pirated circulation for upsetting structural inequalities, nor focuses solely on the reproduction of dominant ideology as a one-way, uncontested process. His methodology, marked by an expanded category of “appropriate” research sites, accounts for the resistance and negotiation that take place between presumed industry control and consumer practice—“how” a text accretes and abandons meaning in its travels. The focus on distribution is a necessary move away from research that dwells purely on how consumers create meaning with cultural objects. Such studies skip over the circulation process altogether, as though reception and criticism were the only sites for analysis. And while some film-studies work is dedicated to distribution and exhibition in the United States, it is more valuable for concretizing the history of moviegoing than making connections between circulation and textual meaning. It does not appear to have influenced textual analysts to loosen their moorings and become more nimble.

Political-economic-ethnographic approaches that “follow the thing” bring attention to the ways that media texts and commodities change in meaning and
value depending on where and when they are viewed and consumed. Anthropology is also of value to film and media studies because it brings attention to audiovisual practices in the third world that are rarely included in common paradigms of national, postcolonial, or "third cinema." For instance, the Nigerian video film industry has been growing for more than a decade and a half and is now a US$45 million-a-year business, with more than four hundred low-budget narrative feature films released annually. These locally produced films are shot on video and receive no state sponsorship. The homegrown industry has grown so economically powerful that it is referred to as Nollywood and is shaping the media culture of Anglophone and, increasingly, Francophone Africa. In Ghana and Kenya, especially, production companies are trying to keep up with and imitate the Nigerian model, a blend of supernatural horror and telenovela-influenced melodrama that addresses the economic challenges of an emergent cosmopolitanism, even as it makes the country one of the world’s major traders in digital media. Of course, multinational capital is also present. It is no surprise that in Nigeria, British American Tobacco handed out cigarettes to spectators as part of its 2002 "Rothmans Experience It Cinema Tour," which also offered viewers theatrical facilities far beyond the norm and new Hollywood action adventure.

The other force dominating Nigerian screen culture is Bollywood. Brian Larkin’s research on the global reach of Hindi film shows that, in Nigeria, Hindi film rivals and even marginalizes Hollywood, offering a “third space” between Islamic tradition and Western modernity that exerts a powerful influence over Hausa popular culture. Larkin pointed out the difficulty in finding a space for this kind of research within existing disciplinary hierarchies, writing that “the popularity of Indian films in Africa has fallen into the interstices of academic analysis, as the Indian texts do not fit with studies of African cinema; the African audience is ignored in the growing work on Indian film; the films are too non-Western for Euro-American-dominated media studies, and anthropologists are only beginning to theorise the social importance of media.” And one would be hard-pressed to find these films representing “African cinema” at international festivals or embassy screenings. Their popularity raises questions not only about what constitutes “authentic” African cinema (or whether such a category is even useful) but about the limitations of models that fail to recognize the regional power and influence of locally produced popular forms.

Fortunately, studies of transnational cultural flow are becoming more common. The popularity and, in some cases, dominance of Hindi film in a variety of locales—Egypt, Kenya, Japan, Nigeria, and South Asian diasporic communities around the world—as well as the international popularity of telenovelas in places like China and Russia, are being addressed by scholars from diverse disciplinary backgrounds. The proliferation of transnational media currents has prompted Michael Curtin to argue that the study of “media capitals” presents a more viable contemporary alternative to methodologies centered on the nation-state.
such as Mumbai, Cairo, and Hong Kong are financial centers of transnational media production and distribution. Each has evolved its own logics and interests, which do not necessarily correspond to those of any nation-state. By researching the cultural geographies of such media capitals, scholars can attend to the complex spatial and temporal dynamics of a globalized media world. The study of media capitals is not simply about acknowledging the dominance of a place. It must unravel, for instance, how Hong Kong negotiates its status as a cultural and economic nexus for Chinese social enclaves around the world, as well as its marginal position vis-à-vis both China and the West. For Curtin, a media capital is a relational concept; it examines different kinds of flow (economic, cultural, and technological) that are radically contextualized at multiple levels (local, national, and global). Consider the case of Miami. It has become the third-largest audio-visual production hub in the United States after Los Angeles and New York, and perhaps the largest Latin American hub. This was achieved not by happenstance or convenience of location, but through very deliberate policy. The Miami Beach Enterprise Zone offers incentives to businesses expanding or relocating there that include property tax credits, tax credits on wages paid to enterprise zone residents, and sales tax refunds. The Façade Renovation Grant program provides matching grants to qualifying businesses for the rehabilitation of storefronts and the correction of interior code violations. As a consequence of this promotional activity, Miami-based culture industries generated about US$2 billion in 1997, more than any entertainment capital in Latin America, and boasted a workforce of ten thousand employees. By 2000, volume had increased to US$2.5 billion. Other counties in the region are also wooing the entertainment industries. To diminish the difficulties that producers and film companies encounter with the numerous municipalities in the area, Miami-Dade’s Film Commission coordinates assistance to film and television business throughout South Florida. Miami’s status as a media capital has even been promoted during three-minute segments on TV Martí, the U.S.-government-funded, Cuban-exile-run enterprise that sends anti-Castro propaganda to the island, selling media cosmopolitanism as an index of democracy and freedom. Understanding the identity of a screen text produced or circulated under such circumstances necessitates viewing it in the light of global media urbanism and the role of state and capital.

Arjun Appadurai argued that as ethnic groups migrate, they dissolve the spatial boundaries of nation-states that circumscribe reified notions of culture. Ethnographers and media scholars alike must adapt to this changing landscape by focusing on the cultural dynamics of deterritorialization, and the defining roles played by the media in transnational life. With their endless presentation of possible lives, the media make fantasy a social practice for people throughout the world. “Fantasy” in this case does not refer to the escapist experiences often associated with viewing film and television. Rather, Appadurai sees such imaginative engagements as having profound social, cultural, economic, and political
ramifications that may play both transformative and conservative roles in main-
taining, asserting, and re-creating diasporic cultural identities. Images of “home”
mobilize different expressions of exilic identity, from cultural conservation and
social cohesion to extreme nationalism.53

The syncretic cultures created by diasporic communities are mobilized in
different ways to serve a variety of interests. For some, media representations of the
homeland may educate younger exile generations about traditional culture. Marie
Gillespie’s study of London Punjabi media practices, for example, shows how
elders take the viewing of Hindi films with their children and grandchildren as an
opportunity to convey a sense of their past in India.54 For others, nostalgic imagery
can fuel chauvinistic nationalism. There was controversy and even violence among
exiled audiences in 1990 when their image of Iran was challenged during a film
festival devoted to postrevolutionary cinema at the University of California, Los
Angeles.55 And diasporic Vietnamese in Southern California picketed a video store
for fifty-three days in 1999 because its owner, Truong Van Tran, had displayed a
picture of Ho Chi Minh in his Little Saigon shop.56

Today’s most vibrant political-economic-ethnographic studies of film and
other media move beyond textual parameters to show the diverse critical uptakes
and social worlds in which production, distribution, and reception occur. As such,
they intervene in larger discourses: the status of the nation-state as the framework
for understanding culture; issues of cultural imperialism and local autonomy; the
political economy and social lives of media institutions; and the complex dynamics
of transnational media circulation and consumption. The cross-cultural approach
that characterizes much ethnographic methodology also mirrors recent develop-
ments in international cultural studies. Eurocentric tendencies are being redressed
with work that not only is cross-culturally and transnationally oriented, but rec-
ognizes the contributions of scholars who have been doing such work for decades
in Latin America and Asia.57

None of this is to argue for the irrelevancy of interpreting texts. But attention
to their occasionality, their movement through time and space, must recognize the
contingency of texts, their protean malleability—and their form, provided that this
is understood as itself conjunctural, via “discursive analysis of particular actor
networks, technologies of textual exchange, circuits of communicational and tex-
tual effectivity, traditions of exegesis, commentary and critical practice.” In other
words, the specific “uptake” of a text by a community should be our focus; but
not because this reveals something essential to the properties of screen texts or
their likely uptake anywhere else or at any other time. We can discern a “general
outline” of “interests,” applied to specific cases only “upon a piecemeal and local
inspection.”58

To demonstrate the ways in which the political-economic and culturalist
methods we have been describing can be productively combined with textual
analysis, we now adopt an approach that tracks the life of the commodity sign via
an examination of *Gilda*. Our desire is not to demonstrate each aspect of what we described above. Rather, we seek to follow the text’s six-decade career of use. A classic film noir and canonical film-studies text, *Gilda* has been the subject of much elegant criticism, but criticism that has been rather monistic its preoccupation and focus. Our analysis, which incorporates a materialist history of the film’s meaning and life, reveals *Gilda* to be about spaces as much as psyches, something that emerges in its travels and citations as well as its form and style.

**Gilda**

Conventionally understood in film and media studies as a sexual drama, *Gilda* has been analyzed again and again in ways that pay insufficient heed to history and location, so taken are its critics with sex. The narrative backdrop to the film is that Ballin Mundson (George Macready) runs a casino in Buenos Aires. It provides money-laundering services for a global tungsten cartel run by German Nazis. Mundson himself is “an Hitlerian presence,” his facial lesion suggesting an aristocratic German past. The casino and the cartel represent a return to international domination, for as he says, “a man who controls a strategic material can control the world,” which is “made up of stupid little people.” Mundson repeatedly disappears into “the interior,” a mysterious site beyond urban norms, and he is reluctant to celebrate the end of the war. Two of his associates are central to the film: a new and much younger wife, the eponymous Gilda (Rita Hayworth), and a new and much younger personal nondigital assistant, Johnny Farrell (Glenn Ford).

There are numerous signs that Mundson and Farrell do the bad thing together in off-screen space, such as uncharacteristically lengthy glances between the two and references to “gay life.” Ford claimed that he and Macready “knew we were supposed to be playing homosexuals” in a world that film-studies scholar Dyer imagined as “caught between gayness, in no way portrayed positively, and sadomasochism.” It also seems probable that Johnny and Gilda used to do the bad thing, as part of the backstory. When added to Gilda’s repeated efforts to elude the control and physical constraints of men, these signs have rightly fascinated feminist and queer critics. And their investment in psychoanalysis is encouraged and interpellated by the script’s zealously obedient Freudianism: Gilda “complains” that “I can never get a zipper to close. Maybe that stands for something”; she taunts Johnny’s closeness to Ballin (“Any psychiatrist would tell your thought-associations are revealing”); Mundson has an ebony walking stick that turns into a blade and is his “little friend”; he insists to Johnny that “I must be sure that there is no
woman anywhere”; and Johnny tells him, “I was born the night you met me.” For the likes of noir historian Frank Krutnik, Gilda is “perhaps the high-watermark of 1940s erotic displacement.”

And “perhaps” it is. But that much-studied eroticism—or its watermark—has a geohistorical lineage beyond World War II and male-female-male triangulation, a history and a future beyond the boundaries of the film and its Freudianism that could undoubtedly enrich our understanding. For example, Hayworth embodied a new Hollywood aesthetic of difference—won at a price. Her “real” name was Margarita Carmen Delores Cansino, and her parents were New York dancers, her father a Spanish Sephardim. After the family moved west, Margarita was dancing at fifteen at the Agua Caliente (hot water) Jockey Club just north of the U.S.-Mexican border, a favored locale for gangsters and film producers, where she was transmogrified by a Hollywood mogul into Rita, and placed in several pictures as “the Dancing Latin.” Her dark hair was dyed auburn, and she underwent two years of electrolysis to raise her hairline from a supposedly Latina look to what were deemed Anglo norms. Columbia Pictures executive Harry Cohn adopted her as his protégée and instructed producer Virginia Van Upp to manufacture a starring vehicle for her; thus, Gilda.

Hayworth’s sultry torch-singer activities and exotic dancing in the film made her famous. A study of working-class women in Chicago in the mid-1950s found that she represented “luxury and glamour . . . a dashing hero . . . more concerned with the now than with the future” and sexual availability: “She’d like a man that could give her anything she wants. . . . She just wants to show off Rita Hayworth.” No wonder that when an atomic bomb was tested in the Bikini atoll, it was named Gilda and carried images of Hayworth. French T-shirts depicted her as “La vedette atomique” (the atomic scout)—a sign of the volcanic power associated with her semiosis in the film.

While film studies tends to overlook Gilda’s connections to the economic and the geopolitical, references to these trends are abundant in the film, aptly understood by the Village Voice as “the most prominent big-business-as-underworld noir.” Place is very consequential here. Argentina is the most European of all non-European nations because of its population growth from 1880 to 1920, which drew principally on migration from Spain, Italy, Russia, and Central Europe. With the addition of immigrants from nearby Latin American countries, it also became the most urban country in the hemisphere, as rapid economic expansion between 1870 and 1930 ushered in a significant middle class and infrastructural development. But the Depression eroded the country’s export markets in wool, grain, and beef, and fractured the society. This led to fifty years of populist/authoritarian regimes and dictatorships, and a concentration of wealth in elites. A coup in 1930 put the middle class, the military, and the traditional oligarchy in power. Argentina became the centerpiece of Nazi espionage in Latin America, with a spy ring established there in 1937 that also embarked on propaganda, assessing U.S. cultural exports and recruiting fellow travelers. Successive unstable regimes followed until a
further coup in 1943 led by Fascist sympathizers, notably Juan Perón and his wife, Eva—she of *Evita* (Alan Parker, 1996) in which Madonna strips with her gloves as per Hayworth in *Gilda*.\(^6^9\) In 1944, Argentina finally ended diplomatic relations with Germany, and arrested some of its spies.\(^7^0\)

The Peróns dominated the political stage by the end of World War II. In 1946, he became president, leading a bulky, awkward coalition of right- and left-wing workerist populism cobbled together from the urban proletariat, the lower-middle class, and rural workers.\(^7^1\) Perón’s decade in power saw the nation become a “preferred haven for tens of thousands of Nazi war criminals and fellow travelers.” These included the notorious SS medical researcher, Josef Mengele, and Holocaust administrator Adolf Eichmann. Many departed Nazis went on to fruitful careers as advisers to right-wing dictatorships across Latin America. They brought with them large sums of money, much of which was deposited in accounts under Eva Perón’s control, and there were crucial links to Siemens, the German electronics multinational. Meanwhile, Argentina’s application to join the United Nations, resisted by the Soviet Union because of the nation’s late decision to turn against Fascism, was railroaded through by the United States, anxious to add to the list of client states that would give it a majority in the new body.\(^7^2\) As part of the cold war, the U.S. government blended a few anti-Fascist criticism of Perón (a consequence of his anti-Gringo rhetoric) with a large-scale program of aid to ex-Nazis.\(^7^3\)

Johnny’s first line of dialogue in the film, as the camera tilts slowly upwards to show the gringo street gambler’s thrown dice, is extra-diegetic narration, and it speaks to the attitude of the United States toward Latin America from both ruling-class and petit-bourgeois levels: “To me a dollar was a dollar in any language. . . . I didn’t know much about the local citizens.” When two Nazis later dismiss him as “the American Indian,” meddling where he is not welcome, Johnny proudly avows that this is his fate—manifest destiny goes global. Johnny’s makeover from surly swindler to glamorous gambler is achieved blithely: “By the way, about that time the war ended,” he offers in voice-over as a contextual counterpoint to the promise of transcendence implied in his oath to Mundson that “I was born last night.” His character is as distant from time and space as his textual analysts.

Mundson’s casino, where he goes to work, is a “massive South American house of sin.”\(^7^4\) A sign of fabulous, corrupt modernity, the casino is for all the world an engine room of pleasure and deceit, its huge rooms whirring with the sound and vision of spinning wheels, milling crowds, shimmering gowns, and dazzling lights. It represents the uneven modernity of Latin America, as tradition and development overlap in both contradictory and compatible ways. Buenos Aires comes alive in *Gilda* as a bizarre amalgam of sordid street life, glittering wealth, and winding, perennially dark streets. Mundson is like a James Bond villain in his perverse gaze on revelers from a concealed aerie, his manipulation of other conspirators, and his determination to achieve international and interpersonal conquest. And the setting calls up Bondian sequences of excess for the latter-day viewer.
“You can’t talk to men down here the way you would at home. They think you mean it,” says Johnny to Gilda. When a gigolo dances with Gilda, he asks her where she learned to dance. Her reply—“America”—draws puzzlement: “This is not America?” The retort is perfect—the casual arrogance of appropriating the word “America” to stand for the United States is problematized. She goes on to use racial difference to inscribe sexual desire: “I always say there’s something about Latin men. For one thing they can dance. For another thing . . .” She gives him her phone number. Johnny, who is excluded from the conversation because he is not hispano hablante, demands to know what was said. She deceives him, saying that she’d instructed the boy to “hang up if a man answers.” There is no translation for the audience, so most U.S. viewers are placed in the same position as Johnny. They must rely on the translation of a woman who is being set up as simultaneously unreliable and desirable, at least by his lights. Yet her name signifies as palabra de honor (word of honor) in Spain.75

This high-tensile mix of eroticism references hot Latinism mediated through the painfully and painstakingly de-Latinized Hayworth, as well as major world events. It has left a deep historical trace. The contemporary leftist Mexican newspaper La Jornada included Johnny slapping Gilda as one of its remarkable fiftieth-anniversary events,76 while Madrid’s Expansión metaphorized technology stock declines of late 2000 with reference to her.77 And Urban Latino magazine nominated Hayworth alongside Che Guevara among the sixteen sexiest Latin historical figures in 2001, thanks to her part in the film.78 When Madonna sang that “Rita Hayworth gave good face” in her song “Vogue,” there is little doubt that she was alluding to this most famous of sexualized characters, and Pink Martin’s 2001 album Symathique pays tribute to the role. The popular periodical Entertainment Weekly put Gilda at number 21 in its 2002 list of “The 100 Greatest Performances Ignored by Oscar,” and in 2004 the American Film Institute included Hayworth saying “If I’d been a ranch, they would have named me the Bar Nothing” amongst the four hundred most memorable lines of cinema.79

The film’s cultural intertextuality is crucial to any evaluation of its “meaning.” Down to Earth (Alexander Hall, 1947) brings back Macready’s cane and Hayworth’s dance, and Gilda is also a promotional intertext to Orson Welles’ The Lady from Shanghai (1948), from the use of male voice-over and triangulation of desire through to setting and music.80 The Bicycle Thief (Vittorio De Sica, 1948) sees the protagonist making his way around town putting up sections of the Gilda poster, affirming his nation’s poverty and indexing its obligation to accept Yanqui culture as part of the Marshall Plan.81 Macready reprises his part in a 1966 episode of The Man from U.N.C.L.E., “The Gurnius Affair.” He plays a leftover escapee Nazi living in Central America whose plans for global domination are colored by the intense delight he takes in the sadism of his junior underlings. That classic liberal moment of contemporary Hollywood, The Shawshank Redemption (Frank Darabont, 1994), is based on Stephen King’s short story “Rita Hayworth and the Shawshank Redemption.”
Tim Robbins’s tunnel excavation from unjust and brutal imprisonment is secreted behind a classic Gilda poster. Nicole Kidman’s role in Moulin Rouge! was an homage to Gilda, as were characters from André Engel’s latter-day version of Igor Stravinsky’s Rake’s Progress and David Lynch’s Mulholland Drive (2001).

In 1998, a yellow item worn by Hayworth in the film fetched 20,000 francs ($3,571.00) at auction. Her black satin strapless evening dress became perhaps the most famous of all Hollywood garments, complete with interior harness, grosgrain beneath the bust, three stays, and plastic bars softened with a gas flame and placed around the top, thus defying the tendency of such items to fall. Saks Fifth Avenue offered a short version of the gown in 2001, when the “Gilda look” became au courant in London via “a heavy, pale pancake foundation applied with a sponge, and lashings of pale powder,” definition thanks to mascara and eyebrow pencil, blue-red lipstick with a brush, and Vaseline for gloss; the hair relied on Titian reds and golden chestnuts plus medium rollers, topped off with beer or tea to set it. The Gilda style was de rigueur at Naomi Campbell’s St Tropez birthday party during the 2004 Cannes Festival, and Edinburgh’s Evening News could imagine nothing better to enliven Hogmanay. Rumors that the proverbial “little black dress” was on the way “out” that year quickly led to rear-guard actions, based on the certainty that the Gilda look made “[m]en’s jaws drop, from shock and awe,” while Garnier’s summer 2005 cosmetics line was headed by a British Big Brother presenter made up to resemble the role. Watching the film was even recommended to restore the joys of flamenco dancing to a shell-shocked United States after 11 September 2001. It continued to fascinate the Valencia smart set, and invigorated costumes for Comédie Française Molière revivals and 2005–6 Parisian prêt-à-porter. The U.S. Alzheimer’s Foundation sold a Gilda doll in 2000, and held its 2004–5 New Year’s Ball with Gilda look-alikes stalking the room, recalling Hayworth’s finest hour and later illness. No wonder that Ridley Scott, looking back forty years to his childhood memories of the movie, said, “[T]hat’s where I fell in love with Rita Hayworth. . . . Those were the days when you could sit and watch the film twice, and I refused to leave. It was quite an adult movie.” As Sharon Stone put it, “Sometimes I think she got Alzheimer’s because she so desperately wanted to forget being Gilda.” For Spanish viewers of the 1970s, seeing the semi-striptease performance of “Put the Blame on Mame” was a newish sensation—Franco-era censors had cut the original beyond recognition, and the Roman Catholic Church had picketed what remained.

This life after the text is available to a nimble materialist history, but seemingly not to the always-already known world of psychoanalysis. Both the geopolitical setting of U.S. foreign and cultural policy and the latter career of the film text elude Anglo-Yanqui critics. Film and media studies can do better. This does means, not jettisoning texts, but pluralizing and complicating them—understanding them as moments that spin their own tales of travel and uptake, as essentially unstable entities that change their composition as they move across time and space.
When it comes to key questions of texts and audiences—what gets produced and circulated and how it is read—film and media studies must embark on an analysis of hysteresis that looks for overlapping causes and sites. In search of appropriate models or exemplars, we have turned to a political-economic ethnography/ethnographic political economy to reinvigorate textual analysis and perhaps give the undergraduate students we quoted at the beginning of this essay some tools for living in media culture. Gilda and Johnny deserve at least that much.

NOTES

1. We are discussing humanities-based film and media studies as practiced in Britain, the United States, and satellite white-settler colonies such as Australia, Aotearoa/New Zealand, Israel, and Canada.
2. Think of George Yúdice, Andrew Ross, John Hartley, and Rob Nixon, to name just four.
11. May and Shuttleworth, 1933; Dale, 1933; Blumer, 1933; Blumer and Hauser, 1933; Forman, 1933; Mitchell, 1929.
16. As of May 2005, a Google search for the term generated more than 46,000 references.
18. Hunter, 1988; Miller, 1993; Greene and Hicks, 2005.
20. Laurance, 2001; Mekemson and Glantz, 2002; Ng and Dakake, 2002.
21. There are a few exceptions, such as Constance Penley.
27. Though we honor Jump Cut.
28. See references in Miller et al., 2005: 49n5, which provides some material used here, as does Miller, 2003.
32. Two notable exceptions are Powdermaker’s Hollywood ethnography (1950), and Sol Worth et al.’s (1997) work with Navajo filmmakers in the 1960s.
33. Ginsburg et al., 2002; Askew and Wilk, 2002; Bird, 2003; for ethnomethodological stances, see Jalbert, 1999.
34. Ginsburg et al., 2002.
42. Himpele, 1996.
43. But see Bolin, 1998.
45. Ironically, the description was coined in Gringolandia but is now begrudgingly embraced in the South.
51. Many in the Western Hemisphere regard Miami as a Latin American city.
58. McHoul and O’Regan, 1992: 5–6, 8–9.
60. Quoted in Russo, 1987: 78.
63. Christopher, 1997: 141.
70. Polmar and Allen, 1989: 54.
82. Vilar, 2002.

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