Runaway Production, Runaway Consumption, Runaway Citizenship: The New International Division of Cultural Labor

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Think of the Mexican entertainment market, with its young population and fast-growing middle class, as a teenager out looking for a good time after being cooped up for too long. For economically emerging peoples all over the globe, Hollywood speaks a universal language — *Forbes.* (Gubernick and Millman, 1994, p. 95)

Worried that free trade is making their indolent lifestyle less viable, the French are blaming sinister conspiracies and putting quotas on American movies — *Wall Street Journal* — *Europe.* (Brooks, 1994, p. 34)

It’s not the heat, and it’s not the humidity: what’s really enervating is day after relentless day of news reports about the G-7 trade negotiations in Tokyo. GATT. Market-share targets. The Uruguay Round. Consultations with the Canadian Prime Minister. Drowsy yet? Part of the problem is that trade talks always focus on desperately unexciting commodities; given the choice between reading about tariffs on non-ferrous metals and, say, Julia Roberts’ marriage, many people will skip the trade-barriers story. So here’s an age-of-Clinton hybrid: movie stars and arcane trade issues, together in one convenient package — *Time.* (Anderson, 1993)

Introduction

We inhabit a moment popularly understood as ‘the global triumph of the United States and its way of life’ (Hobsbawm, 1998, p.1). Even Henry Kissinger (1999) states that ‘globalization is really another name for the dominant role of the United States.’ This state of affairs is both celebrated and feared; while the *Wall Street Journal* gleefully proclaims that America’s ‘unrivalled dominance’ spreads free-market ideology around the world (Murray, 1999), many nations, both developed and undeveloped, fear that the prolifera-
tion of US-style capitalism means cultural domination, especially through the audiovisual industries.

US global dominance is the outcome of the ‘Washington Consensus.’ The ruling *laissez-faire* dogma since the late 1970s, the ‘Consensus’ favors open trade, comparative advantage, deregulation of financial markets, and low inflation. It has, of course, presided over slower worldwide growth and greater worldwide inequality than any time since the Depression. Job security and real wages are down and working hours are up in the industrialized market economies (IMECS) at the same time as the richest 20% of the world’s people earned 74 times the amount of the world’s poorest in 1997, up from 60 times in 1990 and 30 times in 1960. But despite the manifold catastrophes of the ‘Consensus’ across the late 1990s — Mexico, Southeast Asia, Russia, Brazil, and Argentina — it is still hailed as exemplary policy. Repeated failures are deemed aberrations by apologists, who confidently await ‘the long run,’ when equilibrium will be attained (Palley, 1999, p. 49; Levinson, 1999, p. 21; Galbraith, 1999, p. 13).

The ‘Consensus’ is animated by neo-liberalism’s mantra of business freedom, the marketplace, and minimal government involvement in economic matters. This provides the intellectual alibi for a comparatively unimpeded flow of capital across national boundaries, and the rejection of labor, capital, and the state managing the economy together. The state undermines the union movement on behalf of capital through policies designed to ‘free’ labor from employment laws. In the process, the Keynesian welfare system, which helped to redistribute funds to the working class, is dismantled. Ralph Nader refers to this as ‘a slow motion *coup d’état,*’ in which the historic gains to representative discussion and social welfare made by working people and subaltern groups are subordinated to corporate power (1999, p. 7).

This paper investigates the cultural correlates of the ‘Washington Consensus,’ the increasing global influence of the United States, and the decreasing power of organized labor and the state. We address these issues through a discussion of screen production, consumption, and citizenship, comparing neo-classical economic theory’s account of the sovereign consumer with cultural policy’s account of the cultural citizen. As an alternative to those models, we offer a mixture of approaches to consumption derived from social theory, coupled with a theory of the New International Division of Cultural Labor (NICL), which centralizes the importance of ‘flexible’ cultural labor to the new global cultural economy. We conclude that activists and critical scholars need to expose the contradictions at the center of consumer–citizen rhetorics and strive for democratically accountable forms of intervention. For in an increasingly global division of cultural labor, how citizenship is theorized and practiced matters enormously for working people. How are individual and community rights determined? How should they be determined? Should citizenship be granted based on where people live, were born, or work, the temporary or permanent domicile of their employer, or the cultural impact of a foreign multinational on daily life? Such questions form the backdrop to our paper.

Although cries of cultural imperialism were widespread in the 1960s,
Hollywood’s global expansion in the 1990s was much greater. In 1998, the major US film studios increased their foreign rentals by a fifth from just the year before. Indeed, the overseas box office of $6.821bn was just below the domestic figure of $6.877bn and double the 1990 proportion. International markets in both film and TV are more important now than ever before. Between 1988 and 1993, international box-office receipts for Hollywood increased by 14%, domestic ones by just over half that figure. In contrast, in 1980, the American film industry relied on exports for a third of its annual revenue, the same as 50 years ago. And even though theatrical income as a percentage of a film’s overall profit has been steadily declining since 1980, theater release profits remain the benchmark for prices that producers can charge for television exhibition (Segrave, 1997, p. 238). Hollywood’s global influence extends beyond what can be measured through the ‘legitimate’ economy: revenue lost through the illegal international copying of electronic texts was estimated at $70bn in 1994. This lost revenue became a further incentive for the industry and the US government to redraft the international intellectual property infrastructure (Hills, 1994, p. 185; Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995, p. 127; Mayrhofer, 1994, p. 137).

So this decade has seen a truly foundational change. In 1996, 78% of all cinema tickets sold in the European Union (EU) were for US releases. The most popular 39 films across the world in 1998 came from the United States, and other major filmmaking countries were in decline. The percentage of the box office occupied by indigenous films that year fell to 10% in Germany, 12% in Britain, 26% in France, 12% in Spain, 2% in Canada, 4% in Australia, and 5% in Brazil — all dramatic decreases, to record-low levels in some cases (The Economist, 1998b; Groves, 1994, p. 18, and 1999; Variety, 1999; Theiler, 1999, p. 575; Woods, 1999a).

While its global cultural dominance is virtually unchallenged, the United States is trying to develop this share of the market still further, by mounting major governmental and business assaults on the legitimacy of national self-determination undertaken by other countries that utilize state support to generate and sustain cultural industries. Relying on the notorious provisions of its 1974 Trade Act, the United States threatens sanctions against those who participate in what it regards as unfair trading practices; Hong Kong, for example, was a particular target for what the United States likes to call screen ‘piracy’ until it acquiesced with the Trade Office’s requirements. Meanwhile, the US government, eagerly eyeing China’s 140,000 film theaters, is keen to loosen PRC restrictions on Hollywood imports (USIA, 1997; Barshefsky, 1998; World Trade Organization, 1998; Sullivan, 1999). In 1994, Daniel Toscan du Plantier, then president of the French government’s film marketing body stated: ‘cinema used to be side salad in world commerce. Now, it’s the beef’ (quoted in Cohen, 1994, section H23). How are the ownership and control of this ‘beef’ governed?

The GATT and the WTO

Who can be blind today to the threat of a world gradually invaded by
an identical culture, Anglo-Saxon culture, under the cover of economic liberalism? — François Mitterrand. (quoted in Brooks, 1994, p. 35)

If the European Commission governments truly care about their citizens’ cultural preferences, they would permit them the freedom to see and hear works of their choosing; if they are really concerned about a nation’s cultural heritage, they would encourage the distribution of programming reflecting that heritage — Jack Goldner, President of the Department for Professional Employees, AFL–CIO. (1994, p. H6)

From its emergence in the late 1940s as one of several new international financial and trading protocols, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT) embodied in contractual terms the First World’s rules of economic prosperity: nondiscrimination; codified regulations policed outside the terrain of individual sovereign-states; and multilateralism. Born under the logic of North American growth evangelism, whereby standardized industrial methods, vast scales of production, and an endless expansion of markets would engineer economic recovery and development for the Western European detritus of World War II, simultaneously precluding any turn to Marxism–Leninism, the GATT commenced a long wave of restructuring capitalism. The General Agreement stood for the paradoxically bureaucratic voice of neo-classical economics, rejecting parochial national interests and state intervention in favor of free trade. Officials worked like puritans ordered by some intellectual manifest destiny to disrupt trading blocs and restrict distortions to the putatively natural rhythms of supply and demand as determined by consumer sovereignty and comparative advantage.

From the early days of GATT in the 1940s, the United States had sought coverage of cinema by the General Agreement, without success. Once TV texts became significant trading commodities, they too came onto the agenda. The Europeans maintained, contra the United States, that films and programs were services, not commodities, and hence exempt (Jarvie, 1998, pp. 38–39; McDonald, 1999). The GATT was slow to recognize trade in services (TIS) even though that sector quickly expanded in the postwar era. This was in part because the frequently object-free exchanges that characterize the ‘human’ side to TIS (restaurants, for example) were not especially amenable to conceptualization and enumeration. But as the Western powers saw capital fly from their manufacturing zones, and sought to become net exporters of services, they discovered ways of opening up the area to bureaucratic invigilation.

Today, TIS accounts for 60% of gross domestic product in the IMECS and more than a quarter of world trade. The Punta del Este Declaration of September 1986 began the seven-year-long Uruguay Round of the GATT. Because of pressure from the United States (always the main player in negotiations) in the service of lobbyists for American Express, Citibank, and IBM, the Uruguay Round put TIS, which includes film, television, and broadcast advertising production and distribution as well as the finance industries, education, tourism, and telecommunications, at the center of GATT negotiations for the first time (Grey, 1990, pp. 6–9; Sjolander, 1992–93, p. 54, n. 5). After the United States failed to have cultural industries incorporated in the 1988
Free Trade Agreement with Canada, its foreign-service and trade officials tried to thwart EU plans for import quotas on audiovisual texts. The Union’s ‘Television Without [intra-European] Frontiers’ directive (adopted in 1989 and amended in 1997) drew particular ire for its 49% limit on texts imported by member nations (McDonald, 1999; Theiler, 1999, p. 558). But attempts to have the Uruguay Round derail such policies were almost universally opposed, with significant participation from India, Canada, Japan, Australia, all of Europe, and the Third World, in the name of cultural sovereignty. This position equated the culture industries with environmental protection or the armed forces, as beyond neo-classicism: their social impact could not be reduced to price. In 1993, thousands of European artists, intellectuals, and producers signed a petition in major newspapers calling for culture to be exempt from the GATT’s no-holds-barred commodification (Van Elteren, 1996a, p. 47). Western Europe’s Community law enshrines freedom of expression through media access — the European Union’s alibi for putting quotas on US screen texts, along with the claim that the screen is not a good but a service. The 1993 coalition opposed the idea that the GATT should ensure open access to screen markets, on the grounds that culture must be deemed inalienable (non-commodifiable).

To US critics, this was a smokescreen, with cultural rights secreting the protection of inefficient culture industries and outmoded dirigiste statism (Kessler, 1995; Van Elteren, 1996b; Venturelli, 1998, p. 61). The United States argued from a laissez-faire position, claiming that the revelation of consumer preferences should be the deciding factor as to who has comparative advantage in TV and film production — whether Hollywood or Sydney is the logical place to make audiovisual texts. The United States claimed there was no room for the public sector in screen production, because it crowded out private investment, which was necessarily more in tune with popular taste. Both the active face of public subvention (national cinemas and broadcasters) and the negative face of public proscription (import barriers to encourage local production) were derided for obstructing market forces.

The battle waged here between the European Union (against cultural imperialism) and the United States (for unhampered market access) was won by the European Union; the screen was excluded from the GATT in 1993. But this exclusion has not prevented Hollywood from peddling its wares internationally. As noted earlier, half of Hollywood’s revenue comes from overseas, with Western Europe providing 55%. The United States supplies three-quarters of the market there, up from half a decade ago. Furthermore, the consolidation of Europe into one market has been a huge boon to Hollywood, along with the deregulation of TV (Daily Variety, 1994, p. 16; Van Elteren, 1996b; The Economist, 1998a). And the European screen-trade deficit with Hollywood grew from $4.8bn to $5.65bn between 1995 and 1996 (Film Journal, 1994, p. 3; Hill, 1994, p. 2, p. 7, n. 4; The Economist, 1998a).

The last gasp of the GATT was the 20,000 page protocol that was agreed in Geneva in 1993, signed in Marrakesh in 1994, and ratified domestically by 125 members and fellow-travelers over the next eight months. In January 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) replaced the GATT and bought the latter’s
detritus of GATTocrats. The WTO has a legal personality, a secretariat, and biennial ministerial conferences. This new machinery makes it easier for multinational corporations to dominate trade via the diplomatic services of their home governments’ representatives. Environmental concerns and other matters of public interest no longer have the entrée that GATT granted via recognition of non-government organizations. Multinationals now find it easier to be regarded as local firms in their host countries, and Third World agricultural production has been further opened up to foreign ownership (Dobson, 1993, pp. 573–576; Lang and Hines, 1993, pp. 48–50). But despite its high-theory commitment to pure/perfect competition, political pressures mean the WTO must nod in the direction of archaeological, artistic, and historic exemptions to free-trade totalizations, as the GATT routinely did (Chartrand, 1992, p. 137).

The WTO’s operating protocols favor transparency, most-favored nation precepts, national treatment (identical policies for imported and local commodities), tariffs over other protective measures, and formal methods of settling disputes. Its initial service-industries focus has been on the lucrative telecommunications market, but the Organization is turning to culture. Commodities and knowledges previously excluded from the GATT, such as artworks and international export controls, have been included in the WTO’s remit, with extra-economic questions of national sovereignty eluding the written word of trade negotiation but thoroughly suffusing its implementation and consequences (Zolberg, 1995). Even though GATS (the WTO’s document that constitutes a binding protocol to the results of the Uruguay Round) states that there must be easy market access and no differential treatment of national and foreign service suppliers, it nevertheless allows ‘wiggle room’ to exempt certain services from these principles. This margin for maneuver is utilized, for example, by the European Union when it sets quotas for films.

In 1997, the WTO made its first major movement into the culture industries in a case concerning the Canadian version of Sports Illustrated magazine. The WTO ruled that Canada could not impose tariffs on the magazine because it was enticing advertisers away from local periodicals, thus beginning the Organization’s cultural push (Valentine, 1997; Magder, 1998). In keeping with the Sports Illustrated case, the United States seeks to cluster cultural issues under the catch-all rubric of intellectual property and to disavow questions of national sovereignty or meaning (Venturelli, 1998, pp. 62, 66).4

Since January 2000, the WTO has been conducting GATS 2000, a round of negotiations that further addresses the liberalization of TIS. One major issue is virtual goods. As audiovisual services are absorbed into concepts such as electronic commerce and information and entertainment services, and the distinction between goods and services begins to blur, the European Union fears that the United States will muscle its way into film and TV through insisting on free-market access to new communication services. As Mark Wheeler states, ‘The British Screen Advisory Council (BSAC) has argued that the USA could use the Internet as a Trojan Horse to undermine the Community’s “Television Without Frontiers” directive’ (2000, p. 258).

This is not a purely economic struggle. For as the ‘Washington Consensus’ extends to incorporate culture, a rhetorical battle is being waged between two
forms of subjectivity: the consumer (championed by the United States) and the citizen (championed by the rest of the world). Civil society is meant to be founded on the individual, but not just on the sovereign consumer. For that craven figure ultimately dies alone, surrounded by rotting goods and spent services: anomie is the fate of this isolate, in the lonely hour of the last instance. To avoid such a fate, the individual must also learn sociability and collaboration. In our media-thick era, this dilemma has generated a litany of binary judgements: solo TV-viewing is bad, team bowling is good; gambling on-line is bad, church attendance is good. The liberal individual who can find a way through this thicket of choice and obligation is a magic blend of the selfish and the selfless, the solo and the social. That individual is taken as a model for economic and social policy throughout the world. Economic models are based on the desire to maximize utility in a selfish way — the consumer as a desiring machine. Social models are based on the preparedness to think beyond oneself, to contribute to social cohesiveness via volunteerism that sidesteps the pitfalls of both business and government. We turn now to the subjects of these models.

**Screen Consumption, Screen Citizenship**

Entertainment is one of the purest marketplaces in the world. If people don’t like a movie or record they won’t see it or buy it. The fact that the American entertainment industry has been so successful on a worldwide basis speaks to the quality and attractiveness of what we’re creating — Robert Shaye, Chair of New Line Pictures. (quoted in Weinraub, 1993, p. L24)

FBI + CIA = TWA + Pan Am — graffito written by Eve Democracy in *One + One.* (Jean-Luc Godard, 1969)

What’s the point of saying no to America’s nuclear ships when we’ve said yes, a thousand times yes, to the Trojan Horse of American Culture, dragging it throughout city gates into our very loungerooms. MGM is mightier than the CIA. ... We are, all of us, little by little, becoming ventriloquial dolls for another society. We are losing our authenticity, our originality, and becoming echoes — *Australian Weekend Magazine.* (quoted in Pendakur, 1990, pp. 16–17)

There is a complicated relationship between the citizen and its logocentric double, the consumer. The citizen is a wizened figure from the ancient past. The consumer, by contrast, is naive, essentially a creature of the nineteenth century. Each shadows the other, the national subject versus the rational subject. We all know the popularity of the consumer with neo-classical economists and policy wonks: the market is said to operate in response to this ratiocinative agent, who, endowed with perfect knowledge, negotiates between alternative suppliers and his or her own demands, such that an appropriate price is paid for desired commodities. The supposedly neutral mechanism of market competition sees materials exchanged at a cost that ensures the most efficient people are producing and their customers are content.
This model may occasionally describe life in some fruit and vegetable markets today. But as an historical account, it is of no value: the rhythms of supply and demand, operating unfettered by states, religions, unions, superstitions, and fashions, have never existed as such. Or rather, they have existed as enormously potent prescriptive signs in the rhetoric of international financial organizations, bureaucrats, and journalists, at least since economists achieved their hegemony via the Keynesian end to the Great Depression, and then worked to maintain it, despite 1970s stagflation, via their mass conversion from demand-side to supply-side doctrines. The consumer has become the sexless, ageless, unprincipled, magical agent of social value in a multitude of discourses and institutions since that time. For example, in the screen sector, the decline over the 1990s of non-US film production is often explained away through claims that Hollywood’s international success results from the ‘narrative transparency’ of its continuity story-telling, blended with a vast and internally differentiated internal public of immigrants from diverse cultures, which allegedly makes for a universal means of entertainment that attracts foreign consumers (Olson, 1999). Unmarked in this rationality by their national origins, US audiences are runaways from national culture, animated by individual preferences.

It seems sensible to evaluate the *laissez-faire* rationality introduced above, with consumer interests at its center, as an account of US screen production. This necessitates questioning whether Hollywood is a free market based on consumer demand, and also whether the industry operates under the stated aims of public policy based on the tenets of neo-classical economics — or that relative autonomy from the state, ease of entry by competitors into culture industries, and the resultant diversity of producers guarantee a democratically representative array of textual diversity. We propose four tests of this rationality here, based on the promises and premises of neo-classical economics: (a) freedom of entry into the market for new starters; (b) independence of the culture industries from the state; (c) relationship between the cost of production and consumption; and (d) extent of textual diversity.

Whereas neo-classical economics asserts that there must be freedom of entry into a market for new businesses, this has not been the case in the culture industries. There have been new owners of major Hollywood studios, such as Australia’s Channel Seven and News Corporation, Canada’s Seagrams, and Japan’s Sony, plus a new venture in Dreamworks. But the traditional studios remain as much in charge as ever, as we shall see below in our discussion of flexible specialization.

Another claim of this ideology is that there should not be state subsidies of the industry. Yet the US government endorses trust-like behavior overseas, whilst prohibiting it domestically. The film industry has been aided through decades of tax-credit schemes, the Informational Media Guaranty Program’s currency assistance, and oligopolistic domestic buying and overseas selling practices that (without much good evidence for doing so) keep the primary market essentially closed to imports on grounds of popular taste (Guback, 1984, pp. 156–157; Thompson, 1985, pp. 117–118, 122–123; Guback, 1987, pp. 92–93, 98–99; Schatz, 1988, p. 160; Vasey, 1997, pp. 160, 164). After World
War II, Hollywood’s Motion Picture Export Agency referred to itself as ‘the little State Department,’ so isomorphic were its methods and contents with Federal policy and ideology. The US Department of Commerce continues to produce materials on media globalization for Congress that run lines about both economic development and ideological influence, problematizing claims that Hollywood is pure free enterprise and that its government is uninterested in blending trade with cultural change (Ferguson, 1992, pp. 83–84; Jarvie, 1998, pp. 37, 40). Meanwhile, the Justice Department is authorized to classify all imported films, which it can prohibit as ‘political propaganda’ (as it has done with Canadian documentaries on acid rain and nuclear war, for instance) (Parker, 1991, pp. 135, 137; Sorlin, 1991, p. 93). The United States has 196 (count them) state, regional, and city film and TV commissions, hidden subsidies to the screen industries (via reduced local taxes, free provision of police services, and the blocking of public wayfares), State and Commerce Department briefings and plenipotentiary representation (negotiations on so-called video piracy have resulted in PRC offenders being threatened with beheading, even as the United States claims to be watching Chinese human rights as part of most-favored nation treatment) and copyright limitations that are all about preventing the free flow of information (which the United States is forever instructing less-developed countries to permit in order that they might prosper).

Although it is claimed that there is a relationship between the cost of production and consumption, costs are not reflected in the price of tickets or cable fees. They are amortized through a huge array of venues, so reusable is each copy of each text, unlike a car or painting. A gigantic and wealthy domestic English-language market, when added to numerous venues (video, DVD, broadcast networks, cable, and satellite) makes identical, cheaply reproducible texts into profit centers with less depreciation and more potential for transformation and re-sale than conventional goods.

And finally, this ordering of the industry is supposed to lead to greater textual diversity. In the 1960s, imports accounted for 10% of the US film market. In 1986, that figure was 7%. Today, it is 0.75%. Foreign films are essentially excluded from the United States, as never before (The Economist, 1997). This is due to the corporatization of cinema exhibition plus increases in promotional costs, to the point where subtitling and dubbing become insupportable for independent distributors. In television, the proliferation of channels in the United States over the past ten years has required companies to change their drama offerings significantly. In 1990, action-adventure, the most expensive TV genre, occupied 20% of prime time on the networks; four years later, the figure was around 1% (Schwab, 1994). Now we are seeing the sudden decline of the soap opera. Reality television, fixed upon by cultural critics who either mourn it as representative of a decline in journalistic standards or celebrate it as the sign of a newly feminized public sphere, should frankly be understood as a cost-cutting measure.

What of the other side to our couplet, the citizen, currently invoked in Europe against US demands for a free market? The citizen has also undergone a major revival in the last decade, as social theorists and policymakers have
identified citizenship as a magical agent of historical change. More easily identified than class, and more easily mobilized as a justification for state action, citizenship has become a site of hope for a left that has lost its actually existing alternative to international capital. We now address the utility of this move in the context of film and television.

Two accounts of screen citizenship are dominant in academia, public policy, and social activism. In their different ways, each is an effects model, in that they both assume the screen does things to people, with the citizen understood as an audience member that can be a runaway from both interpersonal responsibility and national culture. The first model, dominant in the United States and exported around the world, derives from the social sciences and is applied without consideration of place. We’ll call this the domestic effects model, or DEM. It is universalist and psychological. The DEM offers analysis and critique of such crucial citizenship questions as education and civic order. It views the screen as a machine that can either pervert or direct the citizen-consumer. Entering young minds osmotically, it can either enable or imperil learning. And it also drives the citizen to violence through aggressive and misogynistic images and narratives. The DEM is found in a variety of sites, including laboratories, clinics, prisons, schools, newspapers, psychology journals, TV network and film studio research and publicity departments, everyday talk, program classification regulations, conference papers, parliamentary debates, and state-of-our-youth or state-of-our-civil-society moral panics (see Buckingham, 1997 and Hartley, 1996). The DEM is embodied in the nationwide US media theatrics that ensued after the Columbine shootings, questioning the role of violent images (not firearms or straight white masculinity) in creating violent citizens. It is also evident in panics about the impact of TV advertisements on the environment or politics.

The second way of thinking about screen citizenship is a global effects model, or GEM. The GEM, primarily utilized in non-US discourse, is specific and political rather than universalist and psychological. Whereas the DEM focuses on the cognition and emotion of individual human subjects via replicable experimentation, the GEM looks to the knowledge of custom and patriotic feeling exhibited by collective human subjects, the grout of national culture. In place of psychology, it is concerned with politics. The screen does not make you a well- or an ill-educated person, a wild or a self-controlled one. Rather, it makes you either a knowledgeable and loyal national subject, or a duped viewer who lacks an appreciation of local custom and history. Cultural belonging, not psychic wholeness, is the touchstone of the global effects model. Instead of measuring responses electronically or behaviorally, as its domestic counterpart does, the GEM looks to the national origin of screen texts and the themes and styles they embody, with particular attention to the putatively nation-building genres of drama, news, sport, and current affairs. GEM adherents hold that local citizens should control local broadcast networks because they alone can be relied upon to be loyal reporters in the event of war, while in the case of fiction, only locally sensitized producers make narratives that are true to tradition and custom. This model is found in the discourse of cultural imperialism, everyday talk, broadcast and telecommunications policy, inter-
national organizations, newspapers, cultural diplomacy, post-industrial service-sector planning, and national-cinema discourse. The enumeration of national authenticity in screen texts through fractional ownership has been common in countries concerned to protect their national cultural economies from foreign imports.

Let’s run through the problems with these models. The DEM suffers from all the disadvantages of ideal-typical psychological reasoning. Each costly laboratory test of media effects based on ‘a large university in the mid-West’ is countered by a similar experiment, with conflicting results. As politicians, grant-givers, and jeremiad-wielding pundits call for more and more research to prove that the screen makes you stupid, violent, and apathetic — or the opposite — academics line up at the trough to indulge their hatred of popular culture and ordinary life and their rent-seeking urge for public money. As for the GEM, its concentration on national culture: (a) denies the potentially liberatory and pleasurable nature of different takes on the popular; (b) forgets the internal differentiation of viewing publics; (c) valorizes frequently oppressive and/or unrepresentative local bourgeoisies in the name of national culture’s maintenance and development; and (d) ignores the demographic realities of its ‘own’ terrain.

Once we add some history, spatiality, and politics to the DEM/GEM, they become more complicated. Consumption and citizenship have a dynamic relationship to left and right discourse. Citizen-consumers are said to be both constructed and corrupted through popular culture. On one side of the debate, the exercise of choice through purchase is supposed to guarantee the democratic workings of a market-driven society, because the culture industries provide what the public desires. It is also supposed to effect social change — for example, because of racist hiring practices, Denny’s restaurant chain is boycotted by some leftists in the United States, some of whom also use the Working Assets long-distance telephone service because it donates a portion of its proceeds to left-wing causes. At certain moments, leftists resisting authoritarian politics may embrace ideologies of liberal individualism and free choice, whereas at other times they may foreground questions of labor rather than consumption in a struggle for collective justice. Nation-building eras see a similar slippage between citizen and consumer, depending on the historical moment and geographical location. For example, state-based modernization projects in Latin America between the 1930s and the 1960s utilized the mass media — song in Brazil, radio in Argentina, and cinema in Mexico — to turn the masses, newly migrated to the cities, into citizens (Martín-Barbero, 1993). Conversely, the 1990s brought a wave of deregulation in the mass media. In lieu of citizen-building, the new logic of the culture industries is the construction of consumers. Néstor García-Canclini notes that this shift in emphasis from citizen to consumer is sometimes linked to the shift of Latin America’s dependency on Europe to a dependency on the United States. He summarizes this position as follows: ‘We Latin Americans presumably learned to be citizens through our relationship to Europe; our relationship to the United States will, however, reduce us to consumers’ (García-Canclini, 2001, p. 1). And in the name of the consumer, ideas of the national popular are eschewed — consumer
choice becomes an alibi for structural-adjustment policies imposed by international lending institutions that call for privatization of the media.

In an era of globalized film and television, the idea that audiovisual spaces should be accountable to local viewers, as well as far-distant shareholders, is a powerful one. But how much can be expected from citizenship and consumer ideals when for the first time, trade between corporations exceeds that between states; deregulation sees huge monopoly capitalists converging and collaborating; screen texts are designed to transcend linguistic and other cultural boundaries; textual diversity is a myth; cultural production is not independent of the state; and finally, many of us live in societies that deny or limit our citizenship and consumption claims?

Does this mean that notions of citizenship and consumption are useless in discussing accountability, sovereignty, and democracy with regard to the culture industries? Not exactly. Theorists such as George Yúdice and García-Canclini have elaborated alternative models of citizenship and consumption that go beyond standard leftist critiques of cultural imperialism (watching US drama will turn rural people around the world into Idaho potato farmers) and invectives about socially responsible shopping (purchasing environmentally sound toilet paper and free-range chicken will transform the world, one roll/wing at a time).

Yúdice argues that it may no longer be possible to speak of citizenship and democracy without also considering consumption; indeed, he suggests that consumption can create a new politics of citizenship. First World practices — such as juridical prosecution of discrimination in the private workplace — and practices from Latin America — such as the need to go beyond individual consumer choices in cultural politics to consider the collaboration of local groups, transnational businesses, financial institutions, media, and non-governmental organizations — can be creatively combined with each other. García-Canclini agrees. Although acknowledging that the private takeover of state cultural functions has ‘compounded the already existing problems of the inadequate development and instability of our democracies’ (2001, p. 2) thus threatening Latin American civil society, he also believes that it is necessary to expand notions of citizenship to include consumption of health, housing, and education.

Both Yúdice and García-Canclini propose a regional federalism that promotes the creation of a specifically Latin American media space. This would be achieved through the state setting quotas for Latin American productions in movie theaters, radio broadcasts, and television programming, the creation of a Foundation for the Production and Distribution of Latin American media, and policies designed to strengthen Latin American economies and regulate foreign capital in order to foster a citizenship that promotes multiculturalism and democratizes the relationship between the nation and the state (Yúdice, 1995).

García-Canclini (1996) criticizes the widespread neo-liberal dismissal of the state as an inappropriate arbiter of regulation and control. He argues that the market and civil society are not the same thing, thus challenging neo-classical assertions that a free market best serves the interests of society at large. This
does not mean a return to the critiques of left-wing cultural commentators that transnational culture perverts pure indigenous traditions — indeed, García-Cancolini’s (1990) theories of hybridity preclude this kind of analysis. Nor does it elicit more aristocratic complaints that mass dissemination corrupts high art. However, it does challenge neo-liberal policymakers and authors such as Mario Vargas Llosa who assert that the free market finally allows peripherally produced cultural products such as the film *Like Water for Chocolate* to be disseminated around the world. García-Cancolini argues instead that without reviving nationalism, there must be a critical state intervention which recognizes that ‘culture is too important to be relinquished exclusively to the competition among international markets’ (1996, p. 155). Yúdice (2000) states that the creation of regional/continental trading blocs, organized with the intent of moderating US audiovisual dominance and providing space for local cultural expression outside national frameworks, must involve public–private partnerships, including the participation of non-governmental organizations, the state, and industry.

But how can this strategy to create an alternative media space avoid the failings of the European model of regional pan-audiovisual culture? The abiding logic of the European Union’s audiovisual cultural policy is commercial: it clearly favors existing large industrial concerns. This has served to bring into doubt the equation of the United States with entertainment and of Europe with education, with art cinema effectively a ‘Euro-American’ genre in terms of finance and management, and, as was noted earlier, much of Hollywood itself owned by foreigners (Lev, 1993). In this sense, the seeming discontinuity with earlier concerns, when the European Union had a primarily economic personality, is misleading: a notion of cultural sovereignty underpins concerns *vis-à-vis* the United States, but so too does support for European monopoly capital and the larger states inside its own walls (Burgelman and Pauwels, 1992). Meanwhile, the old notions of state cultural sovereignty that were so crucial to Europe’s political traditions are being attenuated by the twin forces of ‘bruxellois centralization’ from outside and separatist ethnicities from within (Berman, 1992, p. 1515).

García-Canclini is critical of the European Union’s cultural policies, particularly after the privatization of the communications media in Spain and France. He asserts, however, that the proposal of an audiovisual space is still a good one for Latin America. This is because Latin America has a particular way of being multicultural and modern that is very different from both Europe and the United States. He states that multiculturalism in Latin America is concerned with the need to ‘legimize multiple traditions of knowledge.’ It prioritizes forging solidarity rather than the sectarianism he perceives in US and European multiculturalism. Instead, there is a hybridity which precludes each fighting for his own; the Zapatistas in Chiapas, for example, link their regional and ethnic demands to the nation and to globalization, mounting an inclusive critique of modernity that goes beyond the promotion of isolated local interests (García-Canclini, 2001). García-Canclini attributes this to the hybrid ethnic and national identities in Latin America. These hybrid cultures comprise a particularly uneven form of modernity, which includes complicated
mixtures of tradition, modernity, and postmodernity. García-Canclini calls this hybridity multi-temporal, stating that it results from Latin America’s particular colonial history. That history links the continent in a way that does not apply to Europe, because Latin America is dominated by the Spanish language (with the notable but changing exception of Brazil). The organic unity of this language has been crucial, for example, in the pan-continental and global success of the telenovela, which sees production labor and intertextual references drawn from the entire continent, providing a precedent for a broader Latin American linkage in terms of both personnel and cultural signification (Mazziotti, 1996; Mato, 1999, pp. 248–249).

Picking up from this industrial collaboration, we wish to supplement the contributions of Yúdice and García-Canclini with a labor-theory-of-value approach to media citizenship. For bringing together the economy and textuality of the screen necessitates looking at the terrain of trade and work.

The New International Division of Cultural Labor

We have created a product that by, say, putting the name of Warner Brothers on it is a stamp of credibility. But that could be an Arnon Milchan film, directed by Paul Verhoeven, starring Gerard Depardieu and Anthony Hopkins, and shot in France and Italy, and made with foreign money — John Ptak, Creative Artists Agency of Hollywood. (quoted in Weinraub, 1993, p. L24)

The expression ‘division of labor’ refers to sectoral differences in an economy, the occupations and skills of a labor force, and the organization of tasks within a firm. Life-cycle models of international products suggest they are first made and consumed in the center, in a major industrial economy, then exported to the periphery, and finally produced ‘out there,’ once technology has become standardized and savings can be made on the labor front. Goods and services owned and vended by the periphery rarely make their way into the center as imports (Keynes, 1957, pp. 333–334; Evans, 1979, pp. 27–28; Cohen, 1991, pp. 129, 133–139; Lang and Hines, 1993, p. 15; Strange, 1995, p. 293).

The idea of a New International Division of Labor (NIDL) derives from retheorizations of economic dependency theory that followed the inflationary chaos of the 1970s. Developing markets for labor and sales, and the shift from the spatial sensitivities of electrics to the spatial insensitivities of electronics, pushed businesses beyond treating Third World countries as suppliers of raw materials, to look on them as shadow-setters of the price of work, competing amongst themselves and with the First World for employment. As production was split across continents, the prior division of the globe into a small number of IMECs and a majority of underdeveloped ones was compromised. Folker Fröbel and his collaborators (1980) christened this the NIDL. The upshot is that any decision by a multinational firm to invest in a particular national formation carries the seeds of insecurity, because companies move on when tax incentives or other factors of production beckon (Fröbel et al., 1980, pp. 2–8, 13–15, 45–48;

We suggest that just as manufacturing fled the First World, cultural production has also relocated, though largely within the IMECs, as factors of production, including state assistance, lure film and TV producers. This is happening at the level of popular textual production, marketing, information, and high-culture, limited-edition work. Labor market slackness, increased profits, and developments in global transportation and communications technology have diminished the need for colocation of these factors, which depresses labor costs and deskills workers. ‘Runaway production’ is the common journalistic and industry shorthand for the ensuing exodus of Hollywood production.

How did this globalization of the labor process come about? The standard argument about Hollywood’s industrial history is as follows: an artisanal system obtained in New York from the early 1900s until the wholesale shift to California in the 1920s. Vertically integrated industrialization followed, in the form of a studio system that made and distributed films like car manufacturers made joples, via rationalized techniques of mass production. In the 1940s, the system was undermined by governmental trust-busting and processes of televizualization and suburbanization: the state called on Hollywood to divest ownership of theaters even as the spread of TV and housing away from city centers diminished box-office receipts. The studios are said by some to have entered a post-Fordist phase of flexible specialization via product differentiation and vertical disintegration, relying on high-end genres and subcontracted independent producers, pre- and post-production companies, and global locations, rather than comprehensive in-house services. But despite this splintering, power remains vested in a small number of companies that resemble the very entities that were supposedly opened to competition 50 years ago via anti-trust. How? They have successfully controlled the gateways to film and TV that make real money for minimal outlay — distribution (Aksoy and Robins, 1992). The fact of this continued centralized control makes an interrogation of the NICL all the more pressing.

The US film industry has always imported cultural producers, such as the German Expressionists. This was one-way traffic during the classical Hollywood era until the decade from 1946 saw production go overseas. Location shooting became a means of differentiating stories, and studios purchased facilities around the world to utilize cheap labor. Between 1950 and 1973, just 60% of Hollywood films in-production began their lives in the United States. American financial institutions bought foreign theaters and distribution companies, thus sharing risk and profit with local businesses. This was in keeping with the close historic relationship between the film industry and finance capital: as American banks looked overseas for sources of profit through the 1960s, so they endorsed and assisted efforts by Hollywood to spread risk and investment as widely as possible. By the end of the 1980s, overseas firms were crucial suppliers of funds invested in American film or loans against distribution rights in their countries of origin. Joint production arrangements are now well-established between US firms and French, British, Swedish, Aus-
tralian, and Italian companies, with connections to television, theme parks, cabling, satellite, home video, and the internet. Co-production sees host governments working together or with the United States, as when JFK was funded by a Hollywood studio, a French cable network, a German production house, and a Dutch financier, while *The Full Monty*, supposedly the ur-British film of its generation, is of course owned by Fox (Wasko, 1982, pp. 206–207; Christopherson and Storper, 1986; Briller, 1990, pp. 75–78; Buck, 1992, pp. 119, 123; Marvasti, 1994; Wasko, 1994, p. 33; Kessler, 1995; Wasser, 1995, p. 424, 431; *The Economist*, 1998c; Wasko, 1998, pp. 180–181; Townsend, 1999, p. 9).

Runaway TV and film production from the United States amounted to $500m in 1990 and $2.8bn in 1998. By the end of the 1990s, it was allegedly costing LA another $7.5bn annually in multiplier effects, plus 20,000 jobs. Hollywood’s proportion of overseas productions went from 7% of its total to 27%, according to a study undertaken by the Monitor Group for the Directors and Screen Actors Guilds. Eighty-one percent of runaways went to Canada, a total of 232 in 1998 compared to 63 in 1990. Proponents regard the trend as a sign of successful post-Fordist flexible accumulation, whereby Canadian unions work with business and government to operate competitively in a tripartite heaven (Murphy, 1997). The production of high-profile texts like *Mission: Impossible 2* and *The Matrix* in Australia saw savings on LA prices of up to 30% (Waxman, 1999). Other governments covet such successes: between 1990 and 1998, 31 national film commissions were set up across the globe, many of them solely concerned with attracting foreign capital.

The long-term strategy of successive governments in Britain since 1979 has been to break up unions within the media in order to become a Euro-Hollywood by default: the skills generated in a regulated domain of the screen would be retained without the ‘inefficiency’ of the so-called ‘X-factor’ — labor. In short, flexibility was to supplant wage stability, and texts were to be oriented towards export. As a consequence, the United Kingdom now has a negative balance of screen trade for the first time in TV history. Associated deregulation produced a proliferation of networks and the inevitable search for cheap overseas content (Cornford and Robins, 1998, pp. 207–209). The British Film Commission (BFC) markets UK production expertise and locations by providing overseas producers with a free service articulating talent, sites, and subsidies and generating a national network of urban and regional film commissions. In 1997, seven Hollywood movies accounted for 54% of expenditure on feature-film production in the United Kingdom. The government opened a British Film Office in Los Angeles to normalize traffic with Hollywood by offering liaison services to the industry and promoting British locations and crews. The BFC announced the Blair government’s outlook on cinema: ‘set firmly at the top of the agenda is the desire to attract more overseas film-makers’ (Guttridge, 1996; Hiscock, 1998; British Film Commission n.d.). The London Film Commission promotes the capital to overseas filmmakers, arranges police permits, and negotiates with local residents and businesses. Its defining moment was *Mission: Impossible*, when the Commissioner proudly said of that film’s Hollywood producers: ‘They came up with all
these demands and I just went on insisting that, as long as they gave us notice, we could schedule it’ (Jury, 1996).

In order to keep British studios going, regulations were promulgated in the mid-1990s that meant films entirely made in Britain counted as British, regardless of theme, setting, or stars. So Judge Dredd with Sylvester Stallone was ‘British,’ but The English Patient did too much of its post-production work abroad to qualify — until 1998, 92% of a film had to be created in the UK. At the end of that year, the government reduced this requirement to 75% to encourage American companies to make their films in Britain (Woolf, 1998).

After the success of Titanic, Mexico also became a key site for offshore production, as had been the case periodically since the 1960s, when auteurs such as Sam Peckinpah and John Huston filmed there for the scenery, and Richard Burton plus his attendant paparazzi turned Puerto Vallarta into a tourist destination. Restoring Mexico to the Hollywood map gained James Cameron the Order of the Aztec Eagle from a grateful government, which offers Hollywood docile labor, minimal bureaucracy, a dismal peso, and a new film commission to provide liaison services. Mexico’s film union even maintains an office in LA to reassure anxious industry mavens of its cooperativeness (Sutter, 1998a,b). Perhaps not surprisingly, Rupert Murdoch (1998) welcomes ‘new joint ventures between the Hollywood majors and both public and private broadcasting,’ citing the numbers of European workers invisibly employed in the making of Titanic: ‘this cross-border cultural co-operation is not the result of regulation, but market forces. It’s the freedom to move capital, technology and talent around the world that adds value, invigorates ailing markets, creates new ones.’

In addition to shooting offshore, there is a second, palimpsestic model of the NICL. In an era when US network television is desperately cutting costs, there are opportunities for outsiders. The trend seems to be towards smaller investments in a larger number of programs for television. Put another way, a huge increase in the number of channels and systems of supply and payment is also producing unprecedented concentration of TV ownership. Some examples of the NICL represent a form of vertical investment, with production processes fragmented across the world. But what may be more significant for the future are the horizontal licensing and joint ventures that mirror domestic retailing systems (Roddick, 1994, p. 30; Schwab, 1994, p. 14).

For the culturalist remit of the GEM, the ability to make locally accented infotainment is one way of nations using the NICL. But there are unintended consequences. Consider the Grundy Organisation. It produced Australian TV drama and game shows from the 1950s that were bought on license from the United States. The company expanded to sell such texts across the world, operating with a strategy called ‘parochial internationalism’ that meant leaving Australia rather than exporting in isolation from relevant industrial, taste, and regulatory frameworks. Following patterns established in the advertising industry, it bought production houses around the world to make programs in local languages that were based on formats imported from Australia and drew on US models. From a base in Bermuda, the Organisation produced about 50
hours of TV a week in 70 countries across Europe, Oceania, Asia, and North America until its sale in the mid-1990s to Pearson. This exemplified the NICL offshore — a company utilizing experience in the Australian commercial reproduction industry to manufacture American palimpsets in countries relatively new to profit-centered TV. The benefits to Australia, where a regulatory framework birthed this expertise by requiring the networks to support such productions as part of cultural protection, are unclear (Stevenson, 1994, p. 1; Cunningham and Jacka, 1996, pp. 81–87; Moran, 1998, pp. 41–71). In such cases, the GEM is underwriting local cultural bourgeoisie.

Nor does this geographically splintered production imply a weakening of US control. It is, for example, certainly true that Vancouver and Toronto are the busiest locations for North American screen production after LA and New York, thanks to a weak Canadian currency and tax rebates of up to 22% on labor costs. But the two Canadian locations’ 1998 production slates, of just under $1.5bn, are well behind California’s total of $28bn, which incorporated almost 70% of US film production that year. In the 12 years to 1999, the number of culture industry jobs in California rose 137%, while nationwide US employment in entertainment had grown from 114,000 to 240,000 in ten years (Brinsley, 1999; Madigan, 1999c; Ryan, 1999). The hold on foreign capital is always tenuous and depends heavily on foreign exchange rates. The UK government’s decision to float the pound and free the Bank of England from democratic consultation contributed to a situation in 1998 where a strengthening currency raised costs for overseas investors and encouraged locals to spend elsewhere, with severe implications for offshore film funds. And so the late 1990s offshore-production boom in Australia and Canada, driven in part by scenery, infrastructure, language, subsidization, and lower pay levels than the United States combined with equivalent skill levels, still depended on weak currencies (Pendakur, 1998, p. 229; Woods, 1999b).

The trend remains for North America to attract talent that has been developed by national cinemas to compete with it. Peter Weir’s post-production for The Truman Show or Witness might take place in Australia, satisfying off-screen indices of localism in order to obtain state financing, but does that make for a real alternative to the United States? What does it mean that Michael Apted — James Bond and 7 Up series director — can speak with optimism of a ‘European-izing of Hollywood’ when Gaumont points out that ‘a co-production with the Americans ... usually turns out to be just another U.S. film shot on location’ (Variety, 1994; Apted quoted in Dawtrey, 1994, p. 75; Gaumont quoted in Kessler, 1995, n. 143)? Attempts by the French film industry in the 1980s to attract US filmmakers may have the ultimate effect of US studio takeovers, while diplomatic efforts to maintain local screen subsidization continue even as Hollywood producers and networks purchase satellite and broadcast space across Europe (Hayward, 1993, p. 385). AOL-Time Warner, Disney-ABC, Viacom, NBC, and others are jostling their way into the center of the vast and growing Western European industry as sites of production as much as dumping-grounds for old material. The new stations throughout the continent invest in local programming with cost savings from scheduling American filler (Stevenson, 1994, p. 6).
Not all of this cultural work is directly associated with screen production, of course. Disney ensures that it profits from unsuccessful films via merchandizing (46% of annual revenue is from such sales). Much of the manufacturing is undertaken in Third World countries by subcontractors who exploit low-paid workers. *The Hunchback of Notre Dame* performed poorly at the box-office but sensitively in toy stores, with products made in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Mexico, Brazil, El Salvador, Thailand, Malaysia, St. Lucia, Colombia, the Philippines, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, China, Haiti, the United States, Japan, Denmark, and Canada (Lent, 1998; McCann, 1998; *The Economist*, 1998a; Madigan, 1999a,b; Tracy, 1999).

To summarize, the screen is back where primary and secondary extractive and value-adding industries were in the 1960s, needing to make decisions not just about export, but about the site of production. Advances in communications technology permit electronic off-line editing across the world, but also enable special effects problematizing the very need for location shooting. The trend is clearly towards horizontal connections to other media, global economy and administration, and a break-up of public–private distinctions in ownership, control, and programming philosophy (Marvasti, 1994; Wedell, 1994, p. 325). Screen texts are fast developing as truly global trading forms. This is where the GEM is so influential: US late-night talk show host Jay Leno’s promotional spot for NBC’s pan-European Super Channel promised ‘to ruin your culture just like we ruined our own.’ The GATT, the WTO, and the mythos of the consumer are the devices of that ‘ruination.’

**Conclusion**

In as labor-intensive an industry as the screen, we know that Leno’s promised ‘ruination’ will involve over a million working people in the United States alone, most of whom have low weekly earnings. These groups have important internal divisions between so-called ‘talent’ and ‘craft’ and between heavily unionized film and broadcast workers and non-union cable employees; but their numerical growth and willingness to strike during the dominance of Republican union-busting was a beacon through the 1980s. They stand against virulent anti-union legislation in so-called ‘right-to-work’ states of the United States, the appeal to capital of the NICL, and pressure for Hollywood workers to deunionize in order to retain employment (Christopherson, 1996, pp. 87, 105–106; Gray and Seeber, 1996a, p. 34; Gray and Seeber, 1996b, pp. 4, 7; Wasko, 1998, p. 179, p. 184, n. 4, pp. 185–186).

Even in the United States, the NICL is a tremendously vexed matter for both economy and sovereignty. T-shirts with crossed-out maple leaves and ‘how ‘bout some work, eh?’ proliferate among disemployed workers in the LA screen sector (Ryan, 1999). A Film and Television Action Committee was formed in the late 1990s to eliminate runaway production, allying thousands of workers across acting, directing, and technical and support work (*Business Wire*, 1999). Chair Jack Degovia said of the Canadian government and industry: ‘They came after us. They got us. The effects companies in Silicon Valley are
next’ (quoted in Stroud, 1999). Pressure from US workers angered by the flight of screen labor opportunities abroad has seen a proposed Film Protection Amendment in the US Congress to counter Canadian tax incentives that attract Hollywood production. It may be the start of a major backlash against the NICL (Madigan, 1999b). This oppositional voice in the United States characterizes the flight of capital as a reaction to unfair trading that sees state subsidies precluding open competition on the basis of efficiency and effectiveness. There are equivalent culturalist anxieties. The American Film Institute is concerned about any loss of cultural heritage to internationalism and George Quester laments that British costume history crowds out the space for indigenous ‘quality’ television, claiming there was more Australian high-end drama on US TV in the 1980s than locally produced material (1990, p. 57) — almost a case of GEM-like neuroses! Sean Connery is cast as a Hollywood lead because European audiences love him, while each US film is allotted a hundred generic descriptions for use in specific markets (Dances with Wolves was sold in France as a documentary-style dramatization of Native American life, and Malcolm X was promoted there with posters of the Stars and Stripes aflame) (Danan, 1995, pp. 131–132, 137; Wasser, 1995, p. 433). Critics question what is happening when US drama is scripted with special attention to foreign audiences and political economists argue that a newly transnational Hollywood no longer addresses its nominal audience.

So where to now for leftist cultural politics? We need to utilize contradictions on each side of the discursive divide between the consumer and the citizen, criticizing both neo-classical accounts of consumers and DEM/GEM takes on citizenship. We must beware falling for the rhetoric of citizenship adopted in discriminatory and exclusionary ways (think always of the non-consumer, the non-citizen, and their fate), and require each part of the consumer–citizen divide to illustrate: (a) the history to their account of either consumption or citizenship; (b) the relationship between multinational capital, democracy, and diversity; and (c) the role of the state in consumption, and of corporations in citizenship. Lastly, we must look to minority, indigenous, and migrant interests any time we are told consumers are unmarked, or that citizens at the center of culture within borders.

If cultural imperialism has lost intellectual cachet (even as it has gained diplomatic and political adherents) perhaps the left should go back to where we began, to the person as laborer. The model of citizenship will have to deal with sedomicered workers, with all the dispossessent entailed in that status. And citizenship assumes governmental policing of rights and responsibilities. Does this apply when a NICL is in operation, and deregulation or the protection of retrograde media bourgeoisies seem the only alternatives? To whom do you appeal as a person unhappy with the silencing of your local dramatic tradition through TV imports, but demoralized by the representation of ethnic and sexual minorities or women within so-called national screen drama or network news? We have seen first the slow and now the quick dissolution of cultural protectionism in television. That hardly seems an effective place to struggle. We know that globalization of the industry involves a reconfiguration of the labor force, so perhaps that might give a solid
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material backing to our discussions, alongside the supranationalism proposed by García-Canclini and Yúdice.

Notes

1. With thanks to Nitin Govil.
2. In the mid-1990s, the services sector comprised 70% of gross domestic product in the industrialized nations and 50% in much of the Third World, accounting for $1 trillion a year in trade, perhaps a fifth of the global total (Drake and Nicolaïdis, 1992, p. 37; The Economist, 1994, p. 55).
3. As noted above, GATS 2000 promises to problematize this distinction with its new considerations of new communications technology.
4. Ironically, the first case of this nature went against the United States. The WTO found that American copyright law violated global trade rules by permitting large businesses to play recorded versions of music by foreign artists without paying royalties (Newman and Phillips, 2000).

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