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Can Natural Luddites Make Things Explode or Travel Faster?
The New Humanities, Cultural Policy Studies, and Creative Industries

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A hundred, fifty, even twenty years ago, a tradition of culture, based on the Classics, on Scripture, on History and Literature, bound the governing classes together and projected the image of a gentleman. (J. H. Plumb)[1]

I propose a constructive alternative to the Great Society, which I have chosen to call "A Creative Society" ... to discover, enlist and mobilize the incredibly rich human resources of California [through] innumerable people of creative talent. (Ronald Reagan)[2]

Creative class ideas have generated headlines like "Cities Need Gays To Thrive" and "Be Creative or Die." They have also been slated, attacked and written off by a mob of angry academics, wonks and other pundits. (Max Nathan)[3]

This chapter engages ways of analyzing and intervening in the media industries that derive from attempts to create a practical, progressive, and profound new humanities. I go back to the period between the mid-1950s and 1960s of anxieties about the impact of big science, new technology, and industrial organization on everyday life and aesthetic pursuits. I argue that the humanities prefigured the coming crisis of deindustrialization, and continue to adapt to it. Subsequent transmogrifications into cultural policy studies and creative industries discourse have enabled and responded to the end of what was once a grand bifurcation between the arts and the sciences – at some cost. I suggest that a renewed critical cultural policy studies should be used to analyze media industries.

Exploding Binaries
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In 1956, C. P. Snow coined the term "Two Cultures" in a magazine article that became a lengthy pamphlet the following year. Snow wrote the piece to understand his divided self: "by training ... a scientist: by vocation ... a writer."[4] Fearing that "the whole of western society is increasingly being split into two polar groups,"[5] he perceived the "Two Cultures" as those who quoted theater versus those who could quoted thermodynamics.[6] Snow could move from South Kensington to Greenwich Village and encounter the same discourse. Each site had "about as much communication with MIT as though the scientists

spoke nothing but Tibetan."[7] Artists and humanists were disarticulated from agricultural and industrial change, "as if the natural order didn't exist."[8] Because "literary intellectuals, are natural Luddites ... very little of twentieth-century science has been assimilated into twentieth-century art." But there was an opportunity for the "clashing point" of these discourses "to produce creative chances."[9]

Snow's provocation drew an irritated response from the literary critic F. R. Leavis, whose publishers feared Snow would sue[10] after reading that: "Not only is he not a genius, he is intellectually as undistinguished as it is possible to be."[11] More temperately, the historian J. H. Plumb (1964) lamented, "Quips from Cicero are uncommon in the engineers' lab" and "Ahab and Jael rarely provide a parable for biologists" (7). Plumb and his kind had reason to be worried. The humanities in UK, like the liberal arts in the US, had long formed "the core of the educational system and were believed to have peculiar virtues in producing politicians, civil servants, Imperial administrators and legislators" because they incarnated and indexed "the arcane wisdom of the Establishment." But "the rising tide of scientific and industrial societies, combined with the battering of two World Wars" had "shattered the confidence of humanists in their capacity to lead." Plumb saw just two options, as per Snow: adaptation "to the needs of a society dominated by science and technology, or retreat into social triviality" (7). For Graham Hough (1964), the humanities must embrace "a world dominated by industry and science and large organizations," or be consigned to "the never-never-land of the organic society with those happy peasants Dr. Leavis [and] Richard Hoggart" due to the irrelevance of disciplines that "do not make anything explode or travel faster" (96).

On the other side of the Atlantic, Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, and other far-right conservatives were railing against "Great Society" liberalism, which promised an end to poverty and discrimination through state intervention. Their disastrous defeat at the 1964 presidential election, seemingly the death rattle of the right, was soon followed by Reagan winning the governorship of California. The idea of a "Creative Society" was central to a campaign rhetoric that birthed today's neoclassical,

neoliberal idea of technology unlocking the creativity lurking in individuals, permitting them to become happy and productive in ways that elude corporate and governmental dominance – and discourage collective organization.

Between Hough and Reagan, critic and governor, these cats were onto something. The latter-day emergence of cultural policy studies and creative industries discourse answers the persistent dilemma of making the humanities relevant, while the creativity lobby buys into human-capital doctrines of neoliberalism. Both elements make things explode and travel faster, whether via first-person shooter games or cultural search engines. How did this happen?

Cultural Studies and Cultural Policy Studies

Cultural studies began as a rejection of the traditional humanities' high aesthetic prejudices. Its first three decades, until the 1990s, were characterized by semiotic insurrectionism, with the progressive reader of texts a pacific but vibrant semiotic guerrilla. The next challenge was to engage the public sphere. This represented an articulation with its own past, via the foundational figure of Hoggart. Soon to become the inaugural director of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, he published his first and most famous book, *The Uses of Literacy: Aspects of Working Class Life* (1957) the same year as Snow's polemical pamphlet. In many ways, Hoggart's work generated the shift envisaged by Hough. And it connected with Snow, whose fine phrase "the corridors of power" described lobbying. Hoggart testified in defense of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* at Penguin Books' renowned pornography trial, and the company subsequently endowed the Birmingham Centre. He became part of a tradition known in the UK as "the great and the good." It has counterparts in the UN's Eminent Persons Groups, Royal Commissions, and joint bodies convened by otherwise rivalrous think tanks in the US, for example the AEI (American Enterprise Institute) Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies. The idea is to

blend popular visibility, political bipartisanship, professional expertise, and public interest in bodies that deliberate on matters of policy without the burden of party loyalty or corporate responsibilities. Hoggart served on the UK's Pilkington Committee on Broadcasting and similar inquiries into the arts, adult education, and youth services[12] and went on to become a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) culturecrat.[13]

But the first academic formation of cultural policy studies began in the 1970s, at some distance from cultural studies, in the positivistic social sciences. It developed through the Association of Cultural Economics; conferences on economics, social theory, and the arts; and evaluations of policies and programs undertaken at various colleges and institutes. Publications such as *Arts and Education Policy Review*, the *Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society*, and the *Journal of Cultural Economics* address the arts-academic service to state and capital, dressed up as objectivity.

By contrast with empiricist social science, cultural studies has a more overtly political drive, articulated to social movements and cultural workers' rights. Stuart Cunningham (1992) suggested 15 years ago that:

> Many people trained in cultural studies would see their primary role as being critical of the dominant political, economic and social order. When cultural theorists do turn to questions of policy, our command metaphors of resistance and opposition predispose us to view the policy making process as inevitably compromised, incomplete and inadequate, peopled with those inexpert and ungrounded in theory and history or those wielding gross forms of political power for short-term ends. (9)

He called for cultural studies to displace its "revolutionary rhetoric" with a "reformist vocation," drawing new energy and direction from "a social democratic view of citizenship and the trainings necessary to activate and motivate it" (11). This "engagement with policy" would avoid "a politics of the status quo," because cultural studies' ongoing concern with power would ground it in radicalism. Angela McRobbie (1996) called cultural policy "the missing agenda" of cultural studies, offering a program for change (335). Jim McGuigan (2004)

welcomed this turn, provided that it retained radical insights by connecting to public debate and citizenship rights (21).

This policy trend within cultural studies, which in many ways picked up on Hoggart's example, took off in late 1980s Australia. It involved both locals and a number of scholars who had left the UK, so it had strong ties to more conventional, established protocols of cultural studies. Apart from Cunningham, key figures included Tom O'Regan, Tony Bennett, David Saunders, Ian Hunter, and Colin Mercer. (I worked with them in the two cities where the tendency took firmest hold, Brisbane and Perth.) Their objects of analysis were the media, museums, copyright, pornography, schooling, and cultural precincts. Their methods—archival research, questionnaires, and Foucauldian theory — emphasized the foundational nature of government in the creation of the liberal individual (understood not as per US politics, but rather US education, i.e., a person open to new ideas delivered in a rational form and reasoned manner). In Latin America, similar engagements materialized in the work of Néstor García Canclini (1995), *inter alios*. In the UK, cognate practice was underway at the Greater London Council (Lewis 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1990). Everything seemed to be in accord with Hoggart's heritage, and the yet more radical inspiration of Antonio Gramsci, with culture a terrain of struggle for hegemony. In the words of the venerable German socialist rallying cry, this would be a "Long March of the Institutions" (Mansfield 1990).

Things Traveling Faster

How did cultural policy studies slide into creative industries discourse? The new turn has reacted to the prevailing political economy. The First World recognized that its economic future lay in finance capital and ideology rather than agriculture and manufacturing, and the Third World sought revenue from intellectual property rather than minerals and masses. Changes in the media and associated knowledge technologies over this period have been likened to a new Industrial Revolution or the Civil and Cold Wars. They are touted as routes to economic

development as much as cultural and political expression. Between 1980 and 1998, annual world exchange of electronic culture grew from US $95 billion to US $388 billion. In 2003, these areas accounted for 2.3 percent of Gross Domestic Product across Europe, to the tune of €654 billion – more than real estate or food and drink, and equal to chemicals, plastics, and rubber. The Intellectual Property Association estimates that copyright and patents are worth US $360 billion a year in the US, putting them ahead of aerospace, automobiles, and agriculture in monetary value. And the cultural/ copyright sector employs 12 percent of the US workforce, up from 5 percent a century ago. PriceWaterhouseCooper predicts 10 percent annual growth in the area globally (Dreher 2002; McChesney & Schiller 2002; UNCTAD 2004, 3; European Commission 2007).

The British Academy (2004), the peak national body of the great and the good in the human sciences, notes that: "Whereas the dominant global industries of the past focused on manufacturing industry, the key corporations today are increasingly active in the fields of communications, information, entertainment, leisure" (14–16, 18–19). US economic production in particular has been adjusting away from a farming and manufacturing base to a cultural one, especially in foreign trade. It now sells feelings, ideas, money, health, insurance, and laws – niche forms of identity, aka culture. The trend is to harness the cultural skills of the population to replace lost agricultural and manufacturing employment with jobs in music, theater, animation, recording, radio, TV, architecture, software, design, toys, books, heritage, tourism, advertising, fashion, crafts, photography, and cinema (Towse 2002; UNESCO 2002). The US National Governors' Association argues that "innovative commercial businesses, non-profit institutions and independent artists all have become necessary ingredients in a successful region's 'habitat'" (quoted in Tepper 2002). Right across the US, municipal, regional, and state funding agencies are dropping old funding and administrative categories of arts and crafts, and replacing them with the discourse of the creative industries. The same thing is happening in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. In 2006, Rwanda convened a global conference on the "Creative Economy" to take the social healing engendered by culture and commodify it. Brazil houses the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Development Program's International Forum for Creative Industries. Even India's venerable last gasp of Nehruvianism, its Planning Commission, has a committee for creative industries, and China "is moving from an older, state-dominated focus on cultural industries … towards a more market-oriented pattern of creative industries" (UNCTAD 2004, 7; Ramanathan 2006). They are in thrall to the idea that culture is an endlessly growing resource – in UNCTAD's words, "Creativity, more than labor and capital, or even traditional technologies, is deeply embedded in every country's cultural context" (3).

In the case of the media, a great deal of technology, content, and personnel emerge from universities. This has offered humanities intellectuals already interested in cultural policy – for reasons of cultural nationalism or in opposition to corporate culture – the opportunity to peer at the heart of power. They have shifted their discourse to a copyright-inflected one, focusing on comparative advantage and competition rather than heritage and aesthetics. Neoliberal emphases on creativity have succeeded old-school cultural patrimony.

So the British Academy (2004) invokes cultural studies in the search to understand and further the "creative and cultural industries" (viii). The UK Arts and Humanities Research Council places a high priority on cultural policy studies.[14] The Australian Research Council, which initially supported a major cultural policy initiative under the Gramscian-turned-Foucauldian Bennett, now funds a Centre of Excellence for Creative Industries and Innovation run by a lapsed poet and Girardian (Cunningham) and a hitherto semiotic romantic (John Hartley).[15] Even the prosaic National Research Council of the US National Academies, which would surely never endorse such checkered pasts, explains that the electronic media play "a crucial role in culture," offering "personal, social, and educational benefit" and "economic development" (Mitchell et al. 2003, 1).

Economically, the media have become the leading edge of many export industries; politically, they

are central to democratic communication and the parliamentary process; and culturally, they incarnate and encourage social trends. The US Social Science Research Council (SSRC) surveys the scene in this way:

> Changes in the technologies and organizational structure of the media are transforming public life – in the US and around the world. These changes affect not only the forms of delivery of media content – digital broadcasting, the Internet, and so on – but more fundamentally the ways in which we understand the world, communicate with each other, and participate in public life. Advances in digital technologies, the concentration of media ownership, the privatization of communications infrastructures, and the expansion of intellectual property regimes are underlying features of this transformation – both its causes and effects, and global in reach. What do these developments mean for a democratic society? What does a rich democratic culture look like under these conditions and how can we achieve it?[16]

Ties have strengthened across Snow's two cultures. Computing applications to narrative and art, and vice versa, are well known to professors, from engineering to dance. As Thomas Pynchon (1984) put it, looking back on the "Two Cultures" a quarter of a century later, "all the cats are jumping out of the bag and even beginning to mingle" (1). Faculty at opposite ends of the campus write the same codes, analyze the same narratives, go to the same parties, take the same drugs, and sleep with the same people.

This is not the interdisciplinarity so often crowed about in the humanities – interdisciplinarity without multiple languages, without numbers, without ethnography, without geography, without experiments. This is something much more challenging. The new humanities, the creative industries humanities, responds to a great appeal, a grand passion of the age, where, in Pynchon's memorable words, "even the most unreconstructed of Luddites can be charmed into laying down the old sledgehammer and stroking a few keys instead" to line up with technocrats (41) – where technocrats are artists and critics. Many of these maneuvers are in thrall to Richard Florida (2002) and his business school acolytes, who seek out a "creative class" that they claim

is revitalizing postindustrial towns through a magic elixir of tolerance, technology, and talent, as measured by same-sex households, broadband connections, and higher degrees. True believers in this putative liberation from corporate domination and cultural uniformity argue for an efflorescence of the creative sector via new technology and small business (Cunningham 2002). A new world supposedly makes consumers into producers, frees the disabled from confinement, encourages new subjectivities, rewards intellect and competitiveness, links people across cultures, and allows billions of flowers to bloom in a post-political cornucopia. It's a kind of Marxist/Godardian wet dream, where people fish, film, fuck, and finance from morning to midnight. The mass scale of the culture industries is progressively overrun by the individual talent of the creative sector (Dahlström & Hermelin 2007).

Creative industry academics have become branded celebrities. They descend on welcoming burghers eager to be made over at public expense by professors whose books appear on airport newsstands rather than cloistered scholarly shelves (Gibson & Klocker 2004). These carpet-bagging consultants have sidestepped the historic tasks laid out by the left. Prone to cybertarianism, they are often gullible MIT-like/lite subscribers to digital capitalism and the technological sublime. There are three major groups: Richard Floridians ride around town on their bicycles to spy on ballet-loving, gay-friendly, multicultural computer geeks who have moved to deindustrialized, freezing rust/rusting freeze belts; true-believer Australian creationists criticize cultural policy studies as residually socialistic and textual; and Brussels bureaucrats offer blueprints to cities eager to be made over by culture and tolerance in search of affluence. A makeover is underway "from the rusty coinage of 'cultural industries' to the newly minted 'creative industries'" (Ross 2007, 1).

In part, this is the interdisciplinarity that Snow favored. But he also fought for ordinary people "lost in the great anonymous sludge of history" where life, he said (troping Thomas Hobbes) "has always been nasty, brutish and short" (1987, 26–27; 42). In his commentary on Snow, Pynchon defended old-style Luddites. Far from protesting new technology, they opposed well-established machinery that

had shed jobs over two centuries. Ned Lud was no "technophobic crazy." He recognized that men who did not do productive work controlled the lives of those who *did* work. His concerns matter still.

Today's discourse of creative industries ignores such critical issues as the precariat/immaterial labor, high-tech pollution, and cultural imperialism, not to mention the need to understand industries rather than celebrate them. For instance, the high-technology service and cultural industries of the "new" economy supposedly represent clean business. The Australian Council for the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences' submission to its national Productivity Commission refers to a "new post-smokestack era of industry" (CHASS 2006) – a post-manufacturing utopia for workers, consumers, and residents with residues of code, not carbon. Yet the Political Economy Research Institute's 2004 *Misfortune 100: Top Corporate Air Polluters in the United States* has media owners at numbers 1, 3, 16, 22, and 39 (Boyce 2004). Media production relies on the exorbitant water use of computer technology, while making semi-conductors requires the use of hazardous chemicals, including some known carcinogens. Waste from discarded electronics is one of the biggest sources of heavy metals and toxic pollutants in the world's trash piles. The accumulation of electronic hardware causes grave environmental and health concerns, stemming from the potential seepage of noxious chemicals, gases, and metals into landfills, water sources, and e-waste salvage yards. Much e-cycling is done by pre-teen young girls, who pick away without protection at discarded First World televisions and computers (California alone shipped about 20 million pounds of electronic waste in 2006 to Malaysia, Brazil, South Korea, China, Mexico, Vietnam, and India). They are looking for precious metals to sell, with the remains dumped in landfills (Puckett & Smith 2002; Shabi 2002; Shiva 2002; Lee 2007).

Or consider the labor of designing electronic games. Worker issues include power on the job, pensions, healthcare, and credits. They may make millions for a corporation, but no one knows their names. Big publishers develop exploitative labor practices as their power increases via the destruction or purchase of small businesses. In 2004, ea_spouse anonymously posted (on *LiveJournal*) a vibrant account of grotesque exploitation experienced by her fiancé and others at Electronic Arts (EA), which makes *The Sims* and John Madden games. She eloquently ripped back the veneer of joyous cybertarianism from the industry, noting that EA's claim to blend aesthetics and technology, as per the company's name and trademark ("Challenge Everything") belied both its treatment of workers and its products. Regarding labor: "To any EA executive that happens to read this, I have a good challenge for you: how about safe and sane labor practices for the people on whose backs you walk for your millions?" Regarding texts: "Churning out one licensed football game after another doesn't sound like challenging much of anything to me; it sounds like a money farm" (ea_spouse 2004). Then she detailed the exploitation: a putatively limited "pre-crunch" is announced in the run-up to releasing a new game. A 48-hour week is required, which supposedly obviates the need for a real "crunch" at the conclusion of development; the pre-crunch goes on beyond its deadline; a 72-hour work week is mandated; illness and irritability strike; and a crunch *is* announced – everyone must work 85- to 91-hour weeks, with the occasional Saturday evening off, and no overtime or leave. So many errors are made from fatigue that time is needed to correct them. Turnover among engineers runs at 50 percent. Yet *Fortune* magazine ranks EA among the "100 Best Companies to Work For." It is #91 among corporations that "try hard to do right by their staff" as measured by the Great Place to Work® Institute in San Francisco. EA describes itself to *Fortune* as "a one-class society," and its Vice-President of Human Resources offers the following astonishing dictum: "Most creativity comes at one of two times: When your back is up against the wall or in a time of calm."[17] *Fortune* delights that workers can "refresh their energy with free espresso or by playing volleyball and basketball." In 2007, the firm ranked #62 in the magazine's "List of Industry Stars" (Levering et al. 2003; *Fortune* 2007).

This is the ugly face of the creative sector – for those supposedly atop its cresting wave. Such conditions represent a key switching point in an "hourglass" economy, with increased inequality. Union

protections that classically applied to media workers in the US are displaced by a transfer of insecure conditions from the old arts sector, in the name of flexibility and "fun stuff." People are pushed into the precariat: jobs are part-time and multiple, risk is intense, and disparities in income extreme. Cybertarian statistics, which "orbit, halo-like, around creative industry policy, do not measure such things" (Ross 2007, 7). Concerns about labor seem passé to mavens who testify that the number of billionaires in their thirties involved in the creative industries indexes "an open economy and an open society" (Potts 2006, 339). Some might regard their emergence as a sign of class politics structured in dominance.

It makes sense to track the clever work that propagandists of the creative industries undertake as part of their desire for power. It makes sense to see how intellectual property operates, and acknowledge the cultural components of consumption and hence of many economic sectors. But to believe the rhetoric? The first country to adopt neoliberal creative industries discourse was the US, via Reagan's "creative society," starting four decades ago and providing today's bestselling pop-academic tomes (Caves 2000; Florida 2002). What has been the outcome of a fully evolved fantasy about small business and everyday creativity as motors of economic growth? Crumbling bridges, dangerous freeways, dysfunctional levees, 3 million people homeless, inadequate schooling, an electricity grid that barely functions, 50 million people without healthcare, and politics run by pharmaceutical firms, health insurance, tort law, finance capital, oil corporations, arms manufacturers, tobacco companies, and gun owners – operating very creatively.

UNESCO's Global Alliance for Cultural Diversity (2006) heralds creative industries as a portmanteau term that covers the cultural sector but goes further, beyond output and into that favorite neoliberal canard of process. But the claim that what is made in a sector of the economy does not characterize that sector, that "creativity" is not just an input but an industry's defining quality, is misleading. This bizarre shift in adjectival meaning makes it possible for anything profitable to be catalogued under "creative." The term lacks precision. It doesn't work for independent statisticians and others who must "create" workable categories; more precise efforts at definition significantly diminish the claims made for the sector's economic contributions (Alanen 2007; Department for Culture, Media and Sport 2007; Galloway & Dunlop 2007). A boosterist sleight of hand places the humanities at the center of economic innovation by pretending that it encompasses corporate and governmental information technology (which is where real money is made and real power exercised – and not, sorry, by small business entrepreneurs) (Garnham 2005). It's obvious that big firms rarely innovate. This is not news. But it's inaccurate to regard that fact as a shift in the center of gravity. The cultural industries remain under the control of media conglomerates and communications firms. Who owns www.last.fm and www.myspace.com? (Viacom and News Corp.) Which websites are most read for news? (TV networks and wire services). We must ask whether creative industries discourse amounts to "recycling audio-visual cultural material created by the grassroots genius, exploiting their intellectual property and generating a standardized business sector that excludes, and even distorts, its very source of business," to quote *The Hindu* (Ramanathan 2006). The beneficiaries of innovations by "talented amateurs" are, once again, corporations (Marcus 2005; Ross 2007).

There is minimal proof for the existence of a creative class or that "creative cities" outperform their drab brethren economically. Companies seek skills when deciding where to locate their businesses – but skills also seek work. City centers only attract those who are young and not yet breeding. The centrality of gay culture in the Floridian calculus derives from assuming same-sex households are queer (but university dorms and sorority/fraternity houses are not quite there). Even if this were accurate, many successful cities in the US roll with reaction (consider Houston, Orlando, or Phoenix). The idea of urbanism incipient in US demographic statistics includes the suburbs (which now hold more residents than do cities) so that, too, is a suspect figure in terms of the importance of downtown lofts to economies. There is no evidence of an overlap of tastes, values, living arrangements, and locations between artists and

accountants, despite their being bundled together in the creative concept; nor is it sensible to assume other countries replicate the massive internal mobility of the US population. Finally, other surveys pour scorn on the claim that quality of life is central to selecting business campuses, as opposed to low costs, good communications technology, proximity to markets, and adequate transportation. A European Commission evaluation of 29 "Cities of Culture" disclosed that their principal goal – economic growth stimulated by the public subvention of culture to renew failed cities – has itself failed. Glasgow, for instance, was initially hailed as a success of the program; but many years after the rhetoric, there has been no sustained growth. In 2008, Liverpool became an official City of Culture, having allocated £3 billion in public funds to an arts program, a museum, galleries, a convention center, a retail outlet, renewed transportation, rebuilt waterfront, and every good thing. This was premised on regeneration through culture, but skeptics asked, "Is that a foundation strong enough to sustain a lasting economy? Or ... pyramid selling" (Nathan 2005)? Bureaucrats and consultants make desperate claims to distinguish cities creatively (Bristol lays claim to Cary Grant as a native son) even as the data for London illustrate that the creative industries rely on the health of the finance sector. The upshot of creative industries discourse is that market objectives have over-determined cultural ones. Creative cities are creative ways of euphemizing gentrification for the urban middle class (Hoggart 2005, 168; Miller 2005; Linklater 2006; Oakley 2006; Bell 2007; Freeman 2007; Huijgh 2007; Peck 2007; Ross 2007).

Critical Cultural Policy Studies

In the 1960s, Hoggart posed the following question, even as he championed the expansion of cultural studies into the popular and the practical:

> What is one to make of a medieval historian or classicist who finds nothing odd – that is, nothing to be made sense of, at the least, if not opposed – in the sight of one of his new graduates going without second thoughts into, say, advertising; or of a sociologist or

statistician who will undertake consultant work without much questioning the implications of the uses to which his work is put? (100)

Thirty years later, Virginia Postrel wrote a *Wall Street Journal* op-ed, welcoming cultural studies as "deeply threatening to traditional leftist views of commerce ... lending support to the corporate enemy and even training graduate students who wind up doing market research" (1999, A18).

The question for us is: what sense of the public interest informs contemporary cultural policy studies and creative industries discourse? *Kultur Macht Europa* issued a sterling declaration following its Fourth Federal Congress on Cultural Policy in 2007 about protecting cultural workers as well as proprietors under copyright and other laws, and ensuring diverse media textuality as well as infrastructure. We see similar tensions played out in the Jodhpur Initiative for Promoting Cultural Industries in the Asia-Pacific Region, adopted in 2005 by 28 countries (*Jodhpur Initiatives* 2005). Such concerns should also animate scholarly analysis. And there *are* counterexamples to inspire an alternative view. Across Latin America, media studies has adopted a more critical cultural focus than creative industries discourse, as per the Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (Costa et al. 2003). Cultural studies at the Universidad Nacional Costa Rica offers a trans-Central American perspective on cultural change through the media.[18] Ecuador's Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar focuses on cultural analysis and production through the lens of subalternity, transterritoriality, and local social identities, with an emphasis on cultural policy.[19] Many scholars and activists committed to critical cultural policy studies, such as George Yúdice (2002) in Miami, Stefano Harney (2002) and Kate Oakley (2004 & 2006) in London, David Bell (2007) in Leeds, and Justin Lewis and his collaborators (2005) in Cardiff beaver away, weathering slings and arrows from the comfortably pure ultra-left for engaging with commerce and the state, and sending a few of their own toward those who unproblematically embrace such links.

So what's in the toolbox of a critical cultural policy studies that is practical but retains some skepticism, as opposed to an amiable creative industries

lobby that sees sweetness and light wherever it turns? How might critical cultural policy studies contribute to understanding the media industries, as opposed to regurgitating the anodyne rhetoric of publicity departments, industry mavens, government consultants, and business journalism hacks? I have some general suggestions, which I apply to the case of US screen drama.

The core elements to analyzing the media through critical cultural policy studies are:

- documents from public bureaucracies (international, national, regional, state, and municipal governments) and private bureaucracies (corporations, lobby groups, research firms, nongovernment organizations, and unions);
- debates (congressional/parliamentary, press, lobby group, activist, and academic);
- budgets (where media industries draw their money);
- laws (enabling legislation and legal cases about labor, copyright, and censorship);
- history (what came before and what is new);
- people (who is *included* and who is *excluded* from cultural policy and the media); and
- pollution (the environmental costs of these sectors).

Some core Internet sources are given in Appendix 14.1. The journals listed in Appendix 14.2 will keep you abreast of academic debates in policy-related media areas. Appendix 14.3 contains a list of relevant professional associations.

You can also read surveys of critical cultural policy studies (Miller & Yúdice 2002; Lewis & Miller 2003). Recent histories that bring the relationship between communications and cultural policies into sharp relief include books by Bob McChesney (2007) and Dan Schiller (2007).

Statistics are at the core of analyzing any industry: how many people there are, what they make, what it sells for, who buys it, and so on. In very large countries with wealthy populations, it is very tempting to look to domestic numbers, laws, and trends and effortlessly extrapolate from them to divine what culture is, what people like, and so on. This makes it all the more important for analysts to relativize their own experience, rather than universalize

it. UNESCO promulgated a *Framework for Cultural Statistics* in 1986 that remains the standard. Revised on a piecemeal basis, it will probably be replaced by 2009. Meanwhile, the UN's *International Flows of Selected Cultural Goods, 1994–2003* and *Statistics of Films and Cinemas*, the Latinobarómetro, Eurostat, and Eurobarometer are helpful, along with the European Commission's 2006 *White Paper on a European Communication Policy* and 2007 *European Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World*. More and more major organizations are putting together policy information on the cultural/media/creative industries, such as the Motion Picture Association of America,[20] the National Governors' Association,[21] Americans for the Arts[22] (consult its National Arts Policy Database and creative industries data city-by-city), the World Intellectual Property Organization[23] (which has its own Creative Industries Division and a 2003 *Guide on Surveying the Economic Contribution of the Copyright-Based Industries*), the National Association of Television Program Executives,[24] and the Convenio Andrés Bello.[25] Good ways of staying current include subscribing to online digests, such as the Benton Foundation's service,[26] daily headlines from the Free Press,[27] and Americans for the Arts' list-serv. Be sure to look at non-English language and international sources as well as the dominant ones, or your analysis will betray its provincialism.

Sadly, in the case of the US, most media industries information is proprietary. Tiny but informative research reports sell for thousands of dollars. A further problem is that in the US, unlike most other nations, the fantastical claim is repeatedly made that there is no such thing as cultural policy, or that it exists in live performance and the plastic arts but not the popular media. This laughable canard persists, despite all evidence to the contrary (Miller & Yúdice 2002; Lewis & Miller 2003). So one needs to be particularly inventive to find out the truth, especially when investigating Hollywood, a veritable citadel of cultural policy secreted behind an illuminated sign of private enterprise. Of all the places seeking generation or regeneration through state strategy designed to stimulate industries, California should be the last on the list, given its claims to being at the very heart of laissez-faire. Yanquis take this as an article of faith, and pour scorn on European media

subvention in favor of a mythology that says Hollywood was created because of the desire to tell stories that bound the nation together and, less altruistically, to make money by fleeing the unions and frost of New York's Lower East Side for the Southland's unorganized labor and bountiful sun.

The rhetoric of private enterprise is so powerful that even those who directly benefit from the way that public–private partnerships drive Californian screen drama willfully deny that corporate capital and state aid animate the industry. To transcend that rhetoric, we must follow the money, asking how film and TV are actually financed. Where is the evidence? In movie and TV credits, trade magazines, legal disputes that go to court and necessitate disclosure, balance sheets and annual reports of public film authorities, industry analyses by for-profit research firms (if you can afford them), books about how to shoot offshore or finance your movie with taxpayers' money, and occasional papers or protests from unions or activists. Hollywood relies on the state in a myriad of ways, some of them barely visible. It uses foreign sources of state money, about 200 publicly funded film commissions across the US,[28] Pentagon services, and ambassadorial labor from the Departments of State and Commerce. I shall address these serially, drawing on earlier work (Miller et al. 2005).

If it's German money from the 1990s or the early twenty-first century funding a film, the chances are that it came from tax breaks available to lawyers, doctors, and dentists. If it's French money, it might be from firms with state subvention in other areas of investment, such as cable or plumbing. If a TV show or movie is shot in Canada, public welfare to attract US producers is a given. If it is made in any particular state of the US, the credits generally thank regional and municipal film commissions for cross-subsidy of everything from hotels to hamburgers. State, regional, and municipal commissions reduce local taxes, provide police services, and block public wayfares. Accommodation and sales tax rebates are available to Hollywood producers almost universally across the country. The California Film Commission reimburses public personnel costs and permit and equipment fees, while the state government's "Film California First Program" has covered everything from free services through to wage tax credits.

On the war front, Steven Spielberg is a recipient of the Defense Department's Medal for Distinguished Public Service, Silicon Graphics designs material for military and cultural uses, and virtual-reality research veers between soldierly and audience applications, much of it subsidized by the Federal Technology Reinvestment Project and Advanced Technology Program. The University of Southern California's Institute for Creative Technologies uses military money and Hollywood directors to test out homicidal technologies and narrative scenarios. The governmental-screen industry link is clearly evident in the way that film studios sprang into militaristic action in concert with Pentagon preferences after September 11, 2001, and even became a consultant on possible attacks. Why not form a "White House–Hollywood Committee" while you're at it, to ensure coordination between the nations we bomb and the messages we export? (There is one.) The industry even argues before Congress that preventing copyright infringements is a key initiative against terrorism, since unauthorized copying funds transnational extra-political violence. And with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration struggling to renovate its image, who better to invite to lunch than Hollywood producers, so they will script new texts featuring the agency as a benign, exciting entity?

When it comes to plenipotentiary services, since the 1920s and 1930s, Hollywood lobbyists have regarded the US Departments of State and Commerce as message boys. The State Department undertakes market research and shares business intelligence. The Commerce Department pressures other countries to import screen texts with favorable terms of trade. Negotiations on so-called video piracy have seen Chinese offenders face severe penalties, even as the US claims to monitor human rights there. Protests by Indonesian filmmakers against Hollywood that draw the support of their government see Washington threaten retaliation via industrial sanctions. In the mid-1990s, a delegation to Hanoi of congressmen who fought in the American war in Vietnam ushered in film scouts, multiplex salespeople, and Hollywood films on TV. And the US pressures South Korea to drop screen quotas.

Finally, it is worth seeing how closely the fiscal fortunes of Hollywood are linked to the complexion

of the government. After the 2000 election, Wall Street transferred money away from Silicon Valley/ Alley and Hollywood and toward manufacturing and defense as punishments and rewards for these industries' respective attitudes during the election and subsequent coup. Energy, tobacco, and military companies, 80 percent of whose campaign contributions had gone to George Bush Minor in the 2000 elections, suddenly received unparalleled transfers of confidence. Money fled the cultural sector, where 66 percent of campaign contributions had gone to Al Gore Minor. There was a dramatic shift toward aligning finance capital with the new Administration – a victory for oil, cigarettes, and guns over film, music, and wires. The former saw their market value rise by an average of 80 percent in a year, while the latter's declined by between 12 and 80 percent (Schwartz & Hozic 2001).

Conclusion

The binary of the arts versus the sciences with which I began no longer matters. Those two cultures are blending. Today, we need a politics that is not in thrall to capital, creationism, or consultancy. Otherwise we are left with Billy Bragg's lament in "Tear Down the Union Jack" for the displacement of "the great and the good" by "the greedy and the mean" in "England.co.uk." But cultural policy, particularly in its folkloric arts-and-crafts/wine-cheese-and-trees manifestation, can appear dilettantish and dull. What can it offer alongside creative industries' promise of "technological enthusiasm, the cult of youth, branding and monetization fever, and ceaseless organizational change" (Ross 2007, 2)? Applying critical cultural policy studies to the media industries offers the social movement dynamism of cultural studies and the industrial acuity of political economy, as opposed to the cybertarian mythology of creative industries discourse. Getting to know cultural policy and intervening in it is an important part of participating in politics, because resistance goes nowhere unless it takes hold institutionally. That must be the crux of critical cultural policy work on the media – social movement access and governmental articulation, not subvention of corporations.

Notes

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1 Plumb (1964), p. 7.
2 R. Reagan (1966) The creative society. Speech at the University of Southern California, 19 April. Available online at www.reaganlibrary.com/reagan/speeches/creative.asp.
3 Nathan (2005).
4 Snow (1987), p. 1.
5 Ibid., 3.
6 Ibid., 15.
7 Ibid., 2.
8 Ibid., 14; 23.
9 Ibid., 16; 22.
10 Ibid., 57.
11 Leavis (1972).
12 Hoggart (1973), pp. 182–96; Hoggart (2005), p. 207.
13 Hoggart (2005) looks back on the Pilkington Committee as one of his proudest moments: "A proof of its force came when a wealthy man, financially interested in the establishment of commercial television, publicly burned the report in a garden bonfire, with like-minded friends in attendance" (208).
14 See www.ahrb.ac.uk.
15 See www.arc.gov.au.
16 Source: www.ssrc.org/programs/media.
17 *Fortune* (2007).
18 See www.una.ac.cr.
19 See www.uasb.edu.ec.
20 See www.mpaa.org.
21 See www.nga.org.
22 See www.americansforthearts.org.
23 See www.wipo.int.
24 See www.natpe.org.
25 See www.cab.int.co.
26 See www.benton.org.
27 See www.freepress.net.
28 See www.filmcommissionhq.com.
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
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Appendix 14.1

Core Internet Sources

AfricaMediaOnline, www.africamediaonline.com
Alternative Law Forum, www.altlawforum.org
Arts Management Network, www.artsmanagement.net
Asian Media, www.asiamedia.ucla.edu
Asia Media and Information Center, www.amic.org.sg
Audiovisual Observatory, www.obs.coe.int
Basel Action Network, www.ban.org
Centre for Cultural Policy Research, www.gla.ac.uk/ccpr
Council of Europe Cultural Policy, www.coe.int
Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org
Cultural Democracy, www.culturaldemocracy.net
Cultural Policy & the Arts National Data Archive, www.cpanda.org
Culture Statistics Observatory, www.culturestatistics.net

Digital Divide Network, www.digitaldivide.net
European Commission Education Audiovisual & Culture Executive Agency, http://eacea.ec.europa.eu
Fairness in Accuracy and Reporting, www.fair.org
Feminists for Free Expression, www.ffeusa.org
Free Software Foundation, www.fsf.org
Fund for Women Artists, www.womenarts.org
Global Public Media, http://globalpublicmedia.com
International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies, www.ifacca.org
Observatory of Cultural Policies in Africa, http://ocpa.irmo.hr
Pew Charitable Trusts Cultural Policy, www.pewtrusts.com
Sarai, www.sarai.net
UNESCO, www.unesco.org/culture
Urban Institute Arts and Culture Indicators Project, www.urban.org

Appendix 14.2

Some Key Journals

Asian Journal of Communication
Asian Media
Canadian Journal of Communication
Columbia VLA Journal of Law and the Art
Communication Abstracts
Communication Law and Policy
Communications
Comunicaçao e Sociedade
Comunicaço & Politica
Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies
Cultural Sociology
Entertainment and Sports Law Journal
Entertainment Law Review

Eptic: Revista de Economía Política de las Tecnologías de la Información y Comunicación
European Journal of Communication
European Journal of Cultural Studies
Federal Communications Law Journal
Feminist Media Studies
Fordham Intellectual Property
Gamasutra
Games & Culture
Global Media and Communication
Global Media Journal
Historical Journal of Film, Radio & Television
Information, Communication & Society
International Communication Gazette
International Journal of Communication

International Journal of Communications Law and Policy
International Journal of Cultural Policy
International Journal of Cultural Studies
Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media
Journal of Communication
Journal of Communication Inquiry
Journal of International Communication
Journal of Media Economics
Journal of Media Sociology
Journal of Radio Studies
Journalism
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly
Journalism History
Journalism Studies
Loyola Entertainment Law Journal
Mass Communication & Society
Media & Entertainment Law Journal
Media Development
Media History

Media International Australia
Media Law and Practice
Media, Culture & Society
Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication
New Media & Society
NORDICOM Review of Nordic Research on Media and Communication
Poetics
Political Communication
Public Opinion Quarterly
Revista Electrónica Internacional de Economía Política de las Tecnologías de la Información y de la Comunicación
Screen
Television & New Media
Transnational Broadcasting Studies
Visual Anthropology
Visual Anthropology Review
Women's Studies in Communication

Appendix 14.3

Professional Associations

American Association for Public Opinion Research
American Journalism Historians Association
Asociación Latinoamericana de Investigadores de la Comunicacion
Association for Chinese Communication Studies
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication
Association of Internet Researchers
Broadcast Education Association
Chinese Communication Association

Cultural Studies Association
European Consortium for Communications Research
European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research
Global Communication Research Association
International Association for Media History
International Association for Media & Communication
International Communication Association
Media, Communications & Cultural Studies Association
National Communication Association
Society for Cinema and Media Studies
Southern African Communication Association
Union for Democratic Communications